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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation introduces three sections on giving, employing a variety of 
methods in different environments to investigate giving. The first section, utilizes a simple 
incentivized game to assess differences in risk-sharing norms across communities. In the 
game, subjects decide whether to share resources with anonymous group members who 
have lost a lottery where everyone in the group has the same potential for a positive or 
negative outcome. To gauge the impact of formal institutions on informal risk sharing, 
subjects make a second sharing decision; but this time they have the opportunity to 
purchase simple insurance, which guarantees a positive outcome. I found that insurance 
crowds out informal risk sharing; the amount people share decreases significantly when 
self-insurance is offered, no matter whether the decision maker chooses to insure. 
The second section, studies the effects of successful fundraising campaigns on 
individuals’ philanthropic behavior. We investigate the source of funds that are raised in 
successful campaigns. Using a controlled lab experiment, we ask whether new funds are 
raised, or if individuals merely redirect funds from contributions to other organizations 
following a successful campaign. The results show that a successful campaign increases 
funds raised by the charity. However, the increase in giving to the target charity comes 
entirely at the expense of the other charities. This provides strong evidence for a 
‘crowding-out’ effect for targeted campaigns.  
My third and final section, investigates cooperation, giving, and the effect of 
punishment in two simple games, the trust game and the public goods game. Notably, the 
paper examines the puzzle presented by past experimental results of punishment effects in 
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the games. Punishment increases contributions in the public good game, while decreasing 
cooperation in the trust game. To test the effect of punishment on various sets of game 
parameters, subjects play modified versions of the two games. By observing the 
differences in contributions with and without punishment, I find design features are not 
related to the different effects of punishment.  
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Focusing on altruism and giving, this dissertation introduces three studies 
investigating pro-social behavior. Previous research has established the importance of 
preferences at the individual and group level; the work I present here expands this body 
by investigating these factors in the realm of pro-social behavior.  
In the first essay (Section 2), we use data collected in the field to examine risk-
sharing norms across three different communities. We elicit norms of risk sharing within 
communities by examining how subjects share resources with members of their 
community. By employing a game that avoids the issues of adverse selection or moral 
hazard, we abstract from many factors including social ties, proximity, neediness, or the 
expectation of future reciprocity, which may affect risk-sharing. In doing so, we could 
investigate differences in risk-sharing norms and their causes across three distinct 
communities.  
The experiment utilizes the solidarity game, developed by Selten and Ockenfels 
(1998), where subjects have an opportunity to share resources with a disadvantaged 
member of their three-person group. In each round of the game, subjects have a two-thirds 
chance of earning a positive amount of money and a one-third chance of earning zero. 
Each subject is a member of a group with two other subjects whose identities are unknown 
and is asked to choose whether to transfer funds to members who lost the lottery. Our 
primary treatment introduces the availability of a market alternative for insurance; 
purchasing the market insurance gives the participants a guaranteed positive outcome. 
Subjects then repeat the procedure outlined above with the addition of the insurance 
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option. By comparing the transfers with and without insurance, we can investigate how 
informal risk sharing responds to the presence of formal insurance; we conclude that 
formal institutions crowds out informal risk sharing.  
The inclusion of three distinct communities affords us the opportunity to observe 
if community characteristics such as access to formal credit, access to formal insurance, 
or risk exposure impact giving in this setting. Using the mentioned community 
characteristics, we identify communal norms that could influence informal risk sharing 
behavior. All communities exhibit the norm of sharing with disadvantaged group 
members, but community income strongly influences the amount of the transfer. 
Supporting this finding, we find that sharing risk is strongest in the lowest-income 
community. When insurance is available, we see a significant decrease in informal 
transfers to less fortunate group members. The reduction in sharing comes from both those 
who purchase insurance and by those who do not. Surprisingly, the effect is caused by the 
availability of insurance regardless of pickup; the effect is lowest in the poorest 
community with the strongest norm of sharing. This experiment presented an investigation 
of the effect of formal institutions on informal pro-social behavior. My next project 
(Section 3), examines pro-social behavior in the realm of formal institutions.  
Charitable organizations use creative means to raise funds from donors, and 
campaigns in the United States helped raise much of the 358 billion dollars in charitable 
giving in 2013 (McKitrick, 2014). Recently, there has been a considerable number of 
fundraising campaigns conducted on social media sites. Livestrong, Susan G. Komen for 
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the Cure, Unicef, and the recent ALS Ice Bucket Challenge have illustrated the power of 
successful campaigns.   
Considerable research investigates the factors that affect contributions, on both the 
intensive and extensive margins. However, little is known about the impact the campaign 
of one organization has on giving to other organizations. A successful campaign may 
attract new donors and additional spending by existing donors; but if donors have a 
fundraising budget, then an increase in giving to one cause will be fully offset by a 
decrease in giving to other causes. Thus, targeted campaigns may ultimately crowd out 
giving to the untargeted philanthropic organization. 
To test our hypothesis, we conduct a “real donation” lab experiment (Eckel and 
Grossman 1996) examining whether a successful campaign crowds out giving to other 
charities. In each session, subjects are given an endowment and the opportunity to donate 
to three different Texas charities. Subjects then see a campaign for one of the three 
charities. The campaign we ran in the lab consisted of a short video describing the 
organization’s mission and activities, and urged subjects to give to the targeted charity. 
Following the campaign, subjects again repeated their donation decision.  
By comparing the subjects’ allocations before and after the campaign, we measure 
the effect of the campaign on giving, to the target of the campaign as well as the other two 
charities. In all cases, the campaign succeeded in increasing giving to the target 
organization, indicating that the campaigns were effective. However, in all cases, total 
giving (the sum of donations to all three charities) remained unchanged; put simply, the 
increase in giving to the target charity came entirely at the expense of the other charities.   
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This provides strong evidence for a ‘crowding-out’ effect of a targeted campaign. 
We find that subjects do not increase their total charitable expenditures after receiving the 
video treatment. Instead, they reallocate funds from other charities to the targeted charity. 
This indicates campaigns affect the intensive margin and donors consider charities 
substitutes for each other.  
In response to this finding, we design an additional treatment where we prime 
general charitable behavior. This was done to test the effects of campaigns without 
presenting a trade-off in charities. Using the same design as before, we prime a general 
charitable cause; this charitable prime does not produce an increase in money sent to the 
three charities. These results strengthen our prior evidence that subjects have a set budget 
of spending with regard to charitable contributions. This paper investigated how a positive 
influence can affect pro-social behavior. My last project investigates the opposite through 
testing the effects of potential negative outcomes on pro-social behavior.  
In the final experiment (Section 4), I observe the effect of punishment on giving 
and cooperation. Previous work in this area has found mixed results; in one environment, 
the Public Goods game, punishment is effective at increasing pro-social behavior. 
However, in a second atmosphere, the Trust Game, punishment leads to less pro-social 
behavior. Through a survey of previous literature, I isolate parameters that I believe may 
explain the confounded results. I create hybrid versions of the original games to test my 
hypothesis. 
Using the Frankenstein games, I explore if the structural differences are the 
explanation for the different effect of punishment. In particular, I consider whether the 
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game is repeated, and if the game is simultaneous or sequential. Using a 2x2 design, I run 
four treatments varying the number of rounds (one-shot vs. repeated) and order of play 
(simultaneous vs. sequential.). Using a combination of these factors, we observe the 
impact that punishment has on each game. By measuring the differences in the 
contributions with and without punishment, I can isolate the relationship between 
punishment and separate features of the game.  
My results indicate that punishment is effective in increasing contributions in the 
public goods game, as long as the game is repeated more than once. On the other hand, in 
the trust game there is not a significant increase in cooperation or giving under any setting. 
Even though we see vast differences in the frequency of punishment in both games across 
settings, we find little evidence that the game structure explains the different effects of 
punishment.  
Together, my three essays investigate pro-social behavior with respect to altruism and 
giving in different experimental settings. Through testing the effects of norms, 
punishment, and campaigning, these essays paint a picture that pro-social behavior is 
sensitive to the environment, other actors, and cultural norms.  
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2. USING EXPERIMENTAL GAMES TO UNDERSTAND RISK SHARING 
BEHAVIOR IN THREE COMMUNITIES 
2.1 Introduction 
“The impersonal hand of government can never replace the helping hand of a 
neighbor.”  
         —Hubert H. Humphrey 
Low-income individuals lack access to formal institutions that provide safety nets 
for unforeseen events. Without institutions like insurance, individuals must use informal 
sources of support to overcome the effects of sudden unforeseen shocks. One such 
mechanism that is used is sharing monetary resources with individuals in a community is 
solidarity. Solidarity is defined as “a willingness to help people in need who are similar to 
oneself but victims of outside influences such as unforeseen illness, natural catastrophes, 
etc.” (Selten and Ockenfels 1998, hearafter SO98). Solidarity can be defined as a type of 
informal, indirect reciprocity; taking care of others who have ended up in a bad financial 
situation by chance. This informal mechanism mirrors what many scholars have identified 
as informal risk sharing. Informal risk sharing institutions develop when there is a lack of 
formal market sources of credit and insurance. Risk sharing arrangements exist when 
individuals informally share risk with others, spreading potential losses among members 
of an informal group. Risk sharing occurs in many situations including poor harvest, health 
emergency, lost employment, funeral expenditures, and other unexpected expenses. When 
group members transfer, funds or goods it helps reduce individual exposure to shocks. 
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This informal institution has been shown to insure individuals against income shocks in 
developing countries (Fafchamps and Lund 2003). Risk sharing allows households to 
insure even though formal institutions do not exist.  
Empirical research supports that individuals in developing countries who are 
susceptible to income shocks participate in informal risk sharing groups to help smooth 
consumption when unexpected shocks exist (Townsend 1995, Cox and Jimenez 1998). 
This mitigates losses when formal market solutions are unavailable. Informal risk sharing 
has been observed in the rural Philippines and findings indicate households receive help 
through friends and relatives by “massive transfers of funds in the form of both gifts and 
loans” (Fafchamps and Lund 2003, p. 283). Individuals with low income are frequently 
left without recourse to formal credit, and must rely on members of their network for 
assistance (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006).  
Many of the same problems found in less-developed countries also arise in less-
developed or disadvantaged neighborhoods in developed countries, but this phenomenon 
has not been studied in that context. If individuals have limited access to formal 
institutions, it is likely they rely on the informal mechanisms to smooth income 
fluctuations when unfortunate events occur.  Risk sharing is difficult to study with 
observational data because most such monetary transactions take place off the record. The 
transfers occur through family or community connections, making it difficult to collect or 
obtain this data. However, researchers have utilized games that proxy sharing to measure 
the norms within a community or group: This is our approach. The games offer another 
advantage, in that they can be manipulated to test specific hypotheses about the response 
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of risk sharing to changes in the context or environment. In particular, the effects of a 
formal market alternative like insurance. If an individual can self-insure, it is likely that 
this may have a substantial impact on informal sharing arrangements. Social science 
literature has shown that market alternatives can crowd-out intrinsic pro-social behavior 
(Landmann, Vollan and Frölich 2012, Bowles 2008).  
We implement an artefactual field experiment in three unique communities in a 
developed country. Subjects participate in a game that proxies risk sharing. In this game, 
there are three member anonymous groups and everyone has the same chance of a positive 
or negative outcome. Group members can share resources if they experienced a positive 
outcome, with group members who received a negative outcome purely by chance. The 
transfers the subjects make to group members give us a baseline measure for risk sharing. 
In the treatment, we allow individuals to self-insure, guaranteeing them a positive 
outcome. After subjects, make the decision to purchase insurance we then elicit the same 
transfers as before. This measure allows us to observe the crowding out that a formal 
market alternative has on the informal risk sharing. In this study we elicit norms of 
informal sharing within communities by examining how subjects share resources with 
anonymous others in their community. By removing the social connection, we abstract 
from many factors that might affect risk sharing. These include importance of family or 
friendship ties, proximity, neediness and the expectation of future reciprocity. Utilizing a 
game that rules out the problems of adverse selection or moral hazard that are typically 
associated with sharing groups allows us to observe risk sharing at the most basic level.    
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The experiment produces several interesting results. First, risk sharing occurs in 
developed countries for the same reasons as in developing countries. We find that 
communities with little access to formal institutions share risk more often than 
communities who have access to formal institutions. This is similar to what research in 
developing countries has shown. Individuals use the informal risk sharing as an alternative 
to formal insurance and credit. Second, the availability of insurance crowds out informal 
risk sharing, but the level of crowding out depends on community norms. When strong 
community norms for risk sharing exist, the formal institution has less impact on reducing 
sharing in the informal institution.   
2.2 Background and Prior Research 
Selten and Ockenfels (SO98) develop an experimental game designed to identify 
the willingness of people to help others in their group who are in a worse situation purely 
by chance. This type of sharing is consistent with shocks that individuals may face, such 
as crime or job-loss, that negatively influence income. Solidarity refers to the ties that bind 
individuals together in a community. This can be measured by a willingness to share 
resources with others in the same community in a simple game. 
The “solidarity game” is an incentivized game that involves groups of three 
subjects. Each subject has a 2/3 chance of receiving 10DM, and a 1/3 chance of 0DM. 
Each person makes two contingent decisions, indicating the amount they are willing to 
send in a situation where there is one loser and two winners in their group, or in a situation 
where there are two losers and one winner. The motivation behind the transfers is based 
on individual preferences as well as closeness of group members (Barr and Genicot 2008.) 
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SO98 use this design to determine “types” of giving strategies. The types of 
strategies include individuals who have a fixed budget for giving no matter the number of 
losers, individuals who have a set gift they will send to a loser no matter the number, 
individuals who never transfer any money to losers, or an intermediate type. Bolle et. 2011 
explore motives for giving in the solidarity game. The authors find motives can be 
determined for three quarters of their sample. Works has also explored solidarity 
behaviorbol with context to different cultural impacts such as East and West Germany 
through time (Ockenfels and Weimann 1999, Brosig-Koch et al. 2011.) 
Many adaptations of the basic solidarity games have been studied. For example, 
Büchner, (2007) look at gift transfers before or after finding out if the person is lucky. 
Trhal and Radermacher (2009) observe self- inflicted neediness on sharing behavior in the 
solidarity game.They find no difference in gifts in these two environments. Other authors 
have designed different games to look at informal risk sharing in groups of two in a 
laboratory setting. (Charness and Genicot, 2009) The authors’ find risk aversion plays a 
role in risk sharing, by making a person ultimately smooth consumption over time in a 
student population. Extensive research has been done in field settings regarding risk 
sharing. The field studies have taken place throughout the world in less developed areas. 
For example, Attanasio, et al. 2012 shows that individuals assortatively risk pool, and 
confirms that network connections and proximity have influence on an individual’s 
willingness to share resources. The closer proximity within a network, the more risk 
attitude influences groups.  
Reciprocal- self-insurance does not happen on a community level, but many times 
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more within the family and friend’s level. (Fafchamps and Lund 2003) Research has been 
done in similar style using a loosely translated solidarity game. The authors offer insurance 
in the rural Philippines. They find:  
“The fact that the crowding-out effect can completely offset the 
protection offered by the insurance hinges on the incomplete take-up. If 
everybody was insured nobody would be left with a catastrophic outcome 
even in the complete absence of solidarity transfers. Yet, while around half 
of all participants opt for insurance if they have the choice, there is a 
substantial part remaining uninsured. Those uninsured now face a much 
higher risk of being left alone with a bad outcome than in the scenario 
when nobody can be insured.” (Landmann, Vollan and Frölich 2012, p.5) 
 
The SO98 solidarity design has been explored in a community field experiment in 
an urban setting in a developed country by my co-authors (de Oliveira, Eckel and Croson, 
2014). The authors find evidence of voluntary, informal risk sharing in an urban poor 
neighborhood. The authors also find significantly less egotistical players and more fixed 
gift type strategies than in student samples. This indicates subjects are exhibiting 
reciprocity towards less fortunate group members. We build upon this study by comparing 
the baseline game and include a treatment offering a formal market for insurance. We 
expand this study across the original community and two additional Texas communities. 
Using the SO98 structure and adopting the simple visual field implementation used in de 
Oliveira, Eckel and Croson (2014) we identify informal sharing behavior when there is no 
formal market alternative, and then examine behavior after introducing an efficient market 
alternative of insurance. Using SO98 design we feel the transfers indicate  a proxy of 
informal sharing and can help gage the willingness individuals have to help less fortunate 
group members. By offering adaptations, we can explore the situation of how formal 
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market alternatives such as insurance can change the solidarity behavior. By examining 
the transfers, we can gauge the degree of solidarity toward worse-off individuals in the 
group whose disadvantage occurs by chance. 
Much of the literature states that less developed countries share risk in lieu of the 
unavailable market alternatives. However, very little research has identified if this practice 
exist in developed countries. It is important to understand if this informal risk sharing 
exists in developed countries, especially poor communities in these countries. Ultimately, 
the design will allow us to examine if solidarity is affected by ones income. In addition, 
by offering a treatment with a formal market alternative we can examine the impact that 
insurance has on informal institutions. By examining the market alternative, we can 
identify individual differences in insurance purchases. We expect to see insurance 
decisions effected by individuals risk preferences. Someone who is risk averse should be 
more likely to purchase insurance. Likewise, individuals living in high-risk areas (high 
crime, natural disaster prone, etc.) might consider insurance differently. We also expect 
the insurance to crowd out sharing to people who did not choose to self-insure. Examining 
three varying communities allows us insight into people’s behaviors about informal 
sharing and individual preferences or community norms that motivate sharing. 
2.3 Experimental Design 
Our research involves a visual representation of SO98’s solidarity game as well as 
a simple variation on the basic game. Our design includes higher stakes (for a non-student 
population) as well concrete randomization procedures. We fabricate this structure so 
subjects can clearly understand the game and decisions. In the treatment, we expand the 
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basic game to examine the availability of a formal market alternative. This market 
alternative is in the form of self-insurance.  
In all three communities, this game is one of multiple experimental games played. 
The experimental games were always run in the same order, with no feedback between 
tasks. Matching for the Solidarity game and treatment took place at the end of the sessions 
only if this game was selected for payment. One game was chosen at random for payment, 
so neither the subjects nor the experimenter knew which activity would be paid until the 
end of the session. 
The Baseline Treatment, subjects play the SO98 solidarity game with increased 
stakes. The subjects have a 2/3 chance of winning $75 and a 1/3 chance of $0. This results 
in the expected value of the baseline decision is $70 (2/3 chance of $75 plus the $20 show-
up payment). Subjects were explained the game and all possible outcomes (No losers, 1 
Loser, 2 Losers, and 3 Losers) using the instruction sheet, and they indicated their transfers 
on the decision sheet (see Figure 1.) Each subject had an independent draw from a bag of 
three chips to indicate if they were winners or losers. The bag contained two “W” chips 
(indicating winner $75) and 1 “L” chip (indicating loser $0). We used very concrete 
randomization methods to insure the subjects were confident in the probabilities of the 
outcomes. Figure 1 shows two situations: The top part mimics the situation when the 
subject and one other group member both drew “W” chips, and there was only one loser 
in the group. The bottom half of the figure indicates the choice when the subject is the 
only group member to have the positive outcome (pull the “W” chip from the bag).  
 
 14 
 
Figure 1: Instructional Page and Decision Sheet 
Instructional Page Subject decision sheet 
 
  
Figures are the actual instruction and  decision sheets subjects saw in the 
experiment 
 
 
 
The baseline treatment allows us to observe the most basic solidarity in absence of market 
alternatives. We consider positive transfers indication of willingness to help group 
members and proxy this as informal sharing. Subjects indicated the amount they would 
like to transfer if they pull a “W” chip from the bag. They made decisions for both cases, 
one loser in the group and two losers in the group. There were no restrictions on transfers 
other than all transfers and the amounts placed in the wallet had to equal $75. 
The Insurance Treatment introduces the possibility of insuring against the loss. 
The insurance itself is efficient, in that the price is less than the expected loss. In the 
treatment subjects can elect to pay a fee of $20 (equal to show-up fee) to insure that they 
will receive the $75.00 with certainty. The insurance increases the expected value of the 
game from $50 to $55 ($75 minus the $20 payment). If subjects choose not to insure (not 
to pay the fee), then they play the baseline game described above. The procedures were 
the same as in the baseline game unless the subject bought insurance therefore replacing 
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the one L chip in the bag with another W chip guaranteeing them to be winners. All 
subjects are still able to send money to the “losers” in the group. Although, it is common 
knowledge the only way an individual would be unlucky (earning $0) is if they did not 
purchase the insurance. Examining the solidarity of group members when everyone has 
an opportunity to insure allows us to estimate the potential impact on sharing when a 
market option is introduced. 
We introduce this treatment in order to: a) observe which individuals purchase 
insurance, and b) if informal sharing is affected by the possibility that individuals can 
insure – i.e., we ask whether the availability of private insurance will reduce the 
willingness of others in the group to bail out its members in case of a loss. The transfers 
subjects make provide insight into the reasons that sharing is employed, and the change in 
community sharing that is likely to occur in the response to a market-based insurance 
option. The informal solidarity is a substitute for market-based insurance, so when 
insurance is introduced it is likely to reduce solidarity within a community. Allowing 
individual who insure to make transfers allows us the opportunity to identify even if even 
the most generous supporters of others may react to the presence of insurance by reducing 
their willingness to support those who do not purchase it.  
 
𝐸𝑉𝐵 = [(
2
3
) $75 + (
1
3
) $0] + $20𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑤−𝑢𝑝 𝑓𝑒𝑒
 
= $70 (1) 
𝐸𝑉𝑇 = [ (
3
3
) $75 ] −  $20𝑓𝑒𝑒
 
+ $20𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑤−𝑢𝑝 𝑓𝑒𝑒
 
= $75 (2) 
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By examining the expected payoffs in both the baseline game (1) and the treatment (2), it 
is clear that   𝐸𝑉𝐵 < 𝐸𝑉𝑇. Considering the expected value of the treatment is more than 
that of the baseline, rational subjects should always pay the fee to purchase the insurance. 
This allows an increase earnings of $5 dollars. Due to the design of this insurance, we 
expect that the take-up rates of insurance should be relatively high.  
2.4 Sample and Data 
The communities differ with regard to income, race, education, and employment therefore 
the baseline and treatment offer insight on community norms on informal sharing as well 
as a formal market alternative. This experiment was conducted as part of the field protocol 
in two different studies covering three distinct communities. Integrating the data from 
these three communities, we test the relationship between communities and behavior in 
the baseline game and treatment. These communities differ from the usual undergraduate 
students, in that they are older, less educated, tend to have children, and are married. We 
describe each study in turn. The field studies recruit participants using similar protocols, 
as follows. 
2.4.1 Brownwood and Port Lavaca 
This study was designed to assess natural disaster preparedness in two Texas 
towns. During this study, data was collected for three consecutive years, beginning in 
2009. The cities are: Port Lavaca, TX, located on the gulf coast, chosen for its exposure 
to risk of hurricanes and tropical storms and Brownwood, TX, located in the interior, 
which faces exposure to risk of flooding and tornados. Over the three-year period, we 
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recruited 224 individuals in Port Lavaca and 208 people in Brownwood. Subjects were 
recruited door-to-door, based on a random sample of residential tax parcels in select 
neighborhoods in the two towns. The solidarity game was conducted in the third year 
(2011), with 71 subjects in Port Lavaca and 98 in Brownwood. In Port Lavaca the two 
samples (total sample and participated in 3rd year) were not statistically different with 
respect to gender (t=1.776), age (t=0.966), marital status (t=0.1793), employment 
(t=0.1103), education (t=0.4498) and income (t=0.8266). In Brownwood the two samples 
(total sample and participated in 3rd year) were not statistically different with respect to 
gender (t=1.082), race (t=1.313), age (t=0.426), marital status (t=0.9597), employment 
(t=0.6733) and income (t=0.217). However the third year sample did vary from the total 
sample in Port Lavaca with respect to race (Race_Sample: µ=3.365 SD=0.765 
Race_Exper: µ=3.685 SD=1.112 t(286)=2.639 p=0.0088). In Brownwood the samples 
varied with respect to education (Education_Sample: µ=3.9902 SD=1.066 
Education_Exper: µ=4.327 SD=1.419 t(300)=2.298 p=0.0223) 
The sample in Port Lavaca is 71% female with an overall mean age of 49. In this 
coastal community, 12.7% of the subjects have a college degree, and 22.5% did not 
graduate high school. Half of the subjects (49%) were married and approximately 39% 
had full time employment. Port Lavaca subjects have a median income of 20K-30K yearly.  
This median falls slightly lower than the city’s median income, which is approximately 
33K year. In Brownwood, the sample has 63% females with a total mean age of 48.9. In 
Brownwood 27.6% of our subject, pool has a college education and 40.8% report some 
college. Half of the subjects were married and had full time jobs. This community is the 
 18 
 
wealthiest of the three, with the median income ranging from 30K to 40K. The solidarity 
game was run in the final sessions in 2011 along with risk, time preference, and strategic 
ignorance. Many of the subjects had participated previously in dictator and ultimatum 
games as well. The subjects were paid for one task chosen at random and earned on 
average $75 including a $20 show-up fee.   
2.4.2 South Dallas 
 The next study is South Dallas Neighborhood study, designed to analyze the 
impact of a large public investment project on a low-income, predominantly African-
American neighborhood. The sample was recruited based on information obtained from a 
geographically weighted sample selected to represent households at varying distances 
from three new light rail transit stations in the neighborhood (Leonard et. Al 2011.) 
Because the goal of the larger study was to examine the impact of light rail investment on 
child behavior outcomes, families with children were preferentially selected into the study. 
Community-based field researchers made initial contact at the participants’ home and 
invited them to come to a community-based field research station to complete the data 
collection. Survey data was collected from 496 participants. Of these, 198 randomly 
selected participants participated in economic experiments. We conducted t-tests to 
compare mean characteristics of the sample that participated in the economic experiments 
versus the sample that completed only survey and obesity measures.1 The two samples 
                                                 
1 The final study is based on a sample of 169 participants with the complete set of variables 
necessary for the analysis that follows. The other data points were independent variables (13 
participants) or the dependent variable (14 participants). 
 19 
 
were not statistically different with respect to gender (t =1.4749), race (t=0.1077), marital 
status (t = 0.0969), or employment (t =1.4536). There was significant statistical difference 
from the sample population and the participants in the experiments concerning age, 
education and income. (Age_Sample: µ=48.43 SD=14.675 Age_Exper: µ=43.484 
SD=13.190; t(674)=4.064 p=0.0001; Education_Sample: µ=3.4347 SD=1.434 
Education_Exper: µ=4.042 SD=0.7497; t(631)=5.5115 p=0.0001; Income Sample: 
µ=2.118 SD=1.5778 Income_Exper: µ=1.2062 SD=1.7242; t(675)=6.6175 p=0.0001) The 
sample is described in Table A.1 in the appendix. 
South Dallas is a community that includes Fair Park in Dallas. In our sample, 96% 
were African American. Our subject pool consisted of 61% women and the mean age was 
44 years old. Only 18% of the subject pool was married and 54.4% of the sample reported 
they were single; 10.4% of our sample was employed full time. The proportion of the 
sample that graduate high school is 42%, with 8.8% college graduates and 22.9% reporting 
dropping out of high school. This community has the lowest income of the three. Ninety-
five individuals in South Dallas (49%) report a household income of less than $10,000.  
The experiments were conducted in November 2009 and February 2010. Among 
the measures collected in that study is a series of experimental games. For the present 
study, we include 181 observations for individuals who took part in this protocol. 
Participants completed the solidarity game and one of two the treatments as two of the 
seven incentivized games that were conducted in the South Dallas sessions. The other 
games are three games assessing risk aversion, and one for time preference (see Figure 1 
for these games), a set of four dictator games, and the trust game. The participants were 
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paid for one of these incentivized games chosen at random at the end of the series, and the 
average earnings were approximately $70 including a $20 show-up fee. Subjects received 
no feedback on the outcomes of the games, except for the one randomly selected for 
payment.  
2.5 Predictions 
Examining the differences in communities, we can make predictive associations 
with what could happen with the monetary transfers to other group members in both the 
baseline and treatment. By examining key variables that likely impact community sharing, 
we identify the directional change that each factor will have on both sharing in the baseline 
as well as the insurance purchase in the treatment.  
The three important factors are access to credit, risk exposure and insurance 
experience. Access to credit will be defined in two parts. First, we will consider the median 
income of the community, and secondly the accessibility of formal financial institutions 
such as banks or credit unions. Risk exposure identifies risks that are more significant than 
a “normal” level of exposure. This could include things such as likelihood of natural 
disasters, as well as unemployment and crime. All these particular issues effect the 
riskiness of living in a particular community. Insurance experience will include familiarity 
with insurance. We will also examine the accessibility of insurance through institutions as 
well as available financial resources to procure insurance.  
We will discuss each community with regard to these three factors. Using survey 
data collected in each community, as well publically accessible information we examine 
each variable with regard each communities.  
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2.5.1 Port Lavaca 
We have identified Port Lavaca as having moderate access to credit. This is 
because Port Lavaca has moderate levels of income (The community has the median 
income out of our three communities). The median income was 20K-30K. We also 
consider this coastal town to have normal access to financial institutions. This community 
has a population of 12,248 covering 13.6 square miles. Within this area are 13 financial 
institutions. 2 There are plenty of resources to access credit. Residents earn enough income 
that allows them to participate in formal financial institutions. In our survey, 80% of 
subjects have checking accounts and 67% save money each month. We also find that 48% 
of participants have access to at least one major credit card.  
 Port Lavaca being a coastal town we can expect them to have risk exposure related 
to natural disaster including hurricanes and tropical storms. The last major natural disaster 
was Hurricane Ike in August of 2008. The city had a mandatory evacuation in preparation 
for the storm. Port Lavaca has multiple chemical production companies. These companies 
include Alcoa, Union Carbide, Du Pont, and Formosa. Lavaca Bay has been a coastal area 
of concern due to these companies and the pollution of the water. In the 1970’s the bay 
experiences mercury contamination due to wastewaters and leakage being disposed of into 
the bay waters. (“Lavaca Bay Restoration”, 2007) Through a survey question, we elicit 
what subjects think the biggest risk to the community is. We find that 78% of subjects 
consider the natural disaster the most risk within the community.  
                                                 
2 This count is accurate as of May 2014. This can change due to new banks opening, closing or 
merging. 
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Due to the impact that weather plays in Port Lavaca we consider their residents to 
have clear understanding of insurance, as well as access to insurance. Due to the cities 
location and the effects that tropical storms or hurricanes have, it is also possible for the 
community to be familiar with governmental assistance after a catastrophic event.  
2.5.2 Brownwood 
Brownwood is considered to have high access to credit due to the community’s 
median income in our sample. This community has the highest level of income out of our 
sample, with the median being 30K-40K. We also see clear evidence that Brownwood 
citizens have normal availability of financial institutions. Brownwood has a population of 
18,972 and the city is 12.6 square miles with approximately 22 banks.2 In our survey, 85% 
of subjects have checking accounts and 72% save money each month. We also find that 
64% of participants have access to at least one major credit card. 
This community also has low risk exposure and has no real threats of natural 
disasters but a possibility of minor natural events including flooding and tornados. The 
last event was a small tornado outside of town in March of 1999. There was little damage 
and no one was injured or killed.  
We also predict that Brownwood has normal levels of insurance experience. 
Brownwood is the community that we use as comparison; this is because the risk level 
associated within this community is the least. Using this as a baseline allows us to compare 
communities with greater risk to one that has less community or individual risk.  
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2.5.3 South Dallas 
We consider South Dallas to have low access to credit. This is not only due to their 
low median income of less than 10K, but also due to the lack of formal institutions within 
the South Dallas neighborhood. South Dallas area has a population of 29,777 people, and 
covers 12.8 square miles. This is similar in size to both of the other communities. Within 
the area there are only two formal banking institutions.2   In our survey, 57% of subjects 
have checking accounts and less than 50% are able to save money each month. We also 
find that only 23% of subjects cash their paycheck (if they get one) at an actual bank. 
Many use the grocery store, check cashing services or a convenience store to have access 
to their money. Due to this shortage of institutions, we consider South Dallas to have little 
access to credit and banking. Subjects have significantly lower access to major credit cards 
than the other communities do. We also find that only 30% of participants have access to 
at least one major credit card.  
 We also consider the South Dallas neighborhood of having high levels of risk 
exposure. This risk comes from various sources including income instability, possible 
minor natural events (flooding or tornados) or risk of crime. The crime rate in Dallas is 
much higher than Port Lavaca or Brownwood. The annual crime rate in South Dallas 
(2013) was 6,953 crimes per 100,000 people. This is compared to Port Lavaca with 
2,099/100,000 and Brownwood 889/100,000.The reported crime rate in South Dallas is 
much higher than the national average. We also predict that South Dallas will have little 
experience with insurance due to their lack of formal institutions as well as the limitations 
placed by their limited income.  
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Table 1: Impact Variables With Regard to Risk Sharing by Community 
  
Access to Credit Risk Exposure 
Insurance 
Experience 
Port Lavaca 
Moderate 
(Mod Inc, Normal 
Institutions) 
Natural Disaster & Industrial 
Accidents 
Bailouts 
Brownwood 
High 
(High Inc, Normal 
Institutions) 
Minor Natural Events Normal 
South Dallas 
Low 
(Low Inc, Low 
Institutions) 
Crime & Income Instability None 
 
 
 
In Table 1, we can see the predicted effects that access to formal credit, risk 
exposure, and insurance experience on each community as discussed above. By examining 
three main factors behind this informal insurance agreement, we can anticipate what will 
happen concerning sharing behavior on the community level.  
2.5.4 Predictions of Behavior 
Summarized in Table 2 we make directional predictions about the amount a 
community will resources with disadvantaged group members as well as purchase 
insurance. If there is less access to credit, we believe this would create a positive 
environment for individuals to share resources informally. We also predict that restricted 
access to credit will create fewer insurance purchases. This is due to the availability of 
financial means to insure, as well as the facilities and companies to purchase said 
insurance. Solidarity should increase when there is greater risk exposure on the 
community or individual level. This increase could be due to natural disasters, job 
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instability or crime. Although the risk exposure between our communities is different, we 
still assume that individuals who are exposed to greater risk may find informal ways to 
mitigate against potential losses and exhibit greater levels of group solidarity. We also 
predict that the more risk an individual is exposed to the more likely they are to purchase 
a formal market alternative such as insurance. Finally, we believe that if an individual has 
little exposure to formal insurance we should see a positive relation to sharing within their 
group, and a negative relation to insurance purchase.  
 
 
Table 2: Relationship Between Factors of Solidarity and Insurance Purchase 
 Solidarity Probability of Insurance Purchase 
Less Access to Credit Positive (+) Negative (-) 
Greater Risk Exposure Positive (+) Positive (+) 
Less Insurance Experience Positive (+) Negative (-) 
 
 
 
By combining Table 1 and 2, we can make predictions on expected risk-sharing 
and insurance behavior by community. We then examine the levels of informal sharing 
for each community as well as the probability for insurance purchase and predict how 
much the formal institution will crowd out the informal sharing. In Table 3 we predict how 
the communities will respond to informal risk sharing, insurance purchases and how the 
formal insurance will affect the informal sharing of risk by community. 
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Table 3: Variable Effects on Solidarity and Insurance Purchase by Community 
  
Solidarity 
Probability of Insurance 
Purchase 
Impact of Insurance on 
Solidarity 
Port Lavaca 
-+- +++ 
Moderate 
moderate high 
Brownwood 
--- +-+ 
Largest 
Low moderate 
South Dallas 
+++ -+- 
Smallest 
high Low 
 
 
 
2.6 Results 
To examine the results, first we must look at what individuals do in the baseline 
treatment of the game. This will allow us to establish levels of informal risk sharing within 
groups. Next, we will examine how the market alternative of insurance affects informal 
transfers. We will also look at which communities and individuals choose to participate in 
the formal insurance market in lieu of the informal market 
2.6.1 Baseline Results (Risk Sharing) 
By examining the transfers, we can gauge the degree of solidarity toward worse-off 
individuals in the group whose disadvantage occurs by chance. These transfers indicate a 
willingness to participate in the informal institution to share risk with others in your group. 
Transfers to one or two losers in one’s group are show in Table 4. The mean transfer for 
each cell is reported. We also include the standard deviation below the mean transfer. We 
can also clearly see in Figure 2 the amount individuals transfer by community in both 
cases of one and two losers. Transfers vary inversely with community-level income 
 27 
 
differences:  The poorest community, South Dallas, transfers the largest sums; and the 
richest sample, Brownwood, transfers the least.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Mean Amounts Sent in Baseline by Community 
  Total Amount Sent – Baseline  
 Baseline Transfer 
 ($75) 
  One Loser  Two Loser 
Port Lavaca 
(n=71) 
17.63 
(12.49) 
22.83 
(17.31) 
Brownwood 
(n=98) 
16.60 
(11.25) 
22.55 
(17.69) 
South Dallas 
(n=201) 
18.68 
(11.63) 
28.10 
(17.19) 
Mean amounts transferred. (Standard deviation in parenthesi s) 
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Figure 2: Transfers by Community in Baseline Game 
 
 
 
 
We see that individual participate in the informal institution by transferring 
positive amounts to less fortunate group members. Seeing this occur in all communities 
indicated that the informal sharing institutions are occurring in communities in developed 
countries. This phenomenon is similar to what researchers find in developing countries.  
Regression analysis is contained in Table 5. Considering there are two 
observations per individual, we use a random-effects panel regression observing two 
observations per subject, the transfer for one loser and two losers. We use models that 
controls for the number of losers and for locality. South Dallas shows significantly higher 
transfers than Brownwood, the omitted locality. Port Lavaca is also higher, but not 
significantly so. Model 2 includes demographic controls: a dummy variable for female, 
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age in years, and income. In our sample, the measure of annual income consists of ten 
categories from “less than $10,000” through “greater than $100,000” in ranges of $10,000. 
We define a variable Low Income, which identifies individuals who earn less than $20,000 
annually.  
When looking at low-income individuals we find a significantly modest decrease 
in giving.3 The variable Age is the subject’s age in years, ranging from 18-91 in our 
sample. We see older individuals share more in our sample. We discover that women send 
less than men do in either the case of one or two losers, similar to Charness and Genicot 
(2009). They conclude that women transfer less in risk-sharing circumstances than their 
male counterparts do. 
Model 3 adds preferences measures: risk aversion, time preference and a survey 
measure of altruism. All variables are defined in Table 6. Because solidarity is an informal 
type of insurance, we expected to see a positive correlation between risk preferences and 
transfer behavior. The more risk averse an individual is, the more likely they are to 
participate in risk sharing to help alleviate any possible stresses from fluctuations of 
income. This is true with our results. People whom are risk averse transfer more than those 
who are more risk taking. This could be due to the anticipation of mutual expectations. I 
help you out, and you will help me out. Risk and time preferences are measured using 
incentivized tasks as part of the experimental protocol. Figure A.1 in the appendix gives 
                                                 
 
3 Changing the low-income variable to include only those earning below $10,000 strengthens the 
results. 
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the pictorial representation of the preference measures, as they were introduced to the 
subject.  
 
 
Table 5: Panel Regression on Amount Transferred, Baseline Game 
Panel Regression, DV=Total Amount Sent 
  Communities Demographics Preferences 
Two Losers 7.566*** 7.296*** 7.416*** 
 (0.65) (0.66) (0.69) 
South Dallas  3.697* 6.232*** 7.022*** 
 (1.66) (1.81) (1.84) 
Port Lavaca 0.658 0.203 2.467 
 (2.10) (2.10) (2.19) 
Female   -0.982 -1.891 
  (1.48) (1.48) 
Age   0.117* 0.121* 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Low Income   -4.472** -4.591** 
  (1.54) (1.54) 
Risk Averse   5.157** 
   (1.92) 
Never Save   --2.007 
   (1.48) 
Altruism   0.970** 
   (0.37) 
Constant 15.791*** 12.484*** 1.406 
 (1.40) (2.99) (4.38) 
Observations 738 703 649 
Number of id 370 352 325 
R2 - within 0.271 0.257 0.261 
       between 0.0192 0.0595 0.116 
       overall 0.0744 0.103 0.149 
Standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + 
p<0.10   
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Table 6: Definition of Variables 
 
 
  
The variable ‘risk aversion’ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject selected one of 
the two lower-risk lotteries5, and 0 if they chose one of the four higher-risk lotteries. The 
coefficient on this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
individuals who exhibit risk aversion are more likely to contribute an additional $5.16 to 
less fortunate group members. The variable Never Save is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the subject never chooses a larger, later amount in time preference decisions. This carries 
a negative coefficient and enforces impatient people are less likely to risk-share. Using the 
Altruistic Values Scale (Nickell 98), we define altruistic behaviors. We find the more 
altruistic an individual is the transfer of funds to less fortunate group members is 
significantly larger than subjects who are not altruistic. (p<0.01) 
Returning to our earlier predictions for risk sharing (table 3) with regard to the three 
                                                 
4 Using Altruism Value Scale: 4 Questions. 1. People should be willing to help others who are less 
fortunate 2. Those in need have to learn to take care of themselves and not depend on others. 3. 
Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me. 4. These days people need to look after 
themselves and not overly worry about others. The highest altruism score is 13 out of a possible 16. 
5 The risk elicitation mechanism we used was Eckel and Grossman (Eckel and Grossman 2002 and Eckel 
and Grossman 2008b) pictorial representation Appendix Figure A.1. The two lowest gambles are 40/40 
and 30/60. 
Variable  What it means 
Altruism4 0=lowest altruism  16=highest altruism 
Low Income 1=Income less than 20K 
Never Save 1=Always choosing $50 tomorrow, never a larger amount at 6 months 
Risk Aversion 1=choosing 40/40 or 30/60 (2 safest gambles) 
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dynamics of this informal mechanism, we confirm the predicted levels of risk sharing 
anticipated for each community. Port Lavaca has a moderate level of sharing, between the 
other two communities. Brownwood has the lowest level of informal sharing. Finally, the 
poorest community South Dallas has the highest level of informal risk sharing, sharing 
almost $3.70 more without additional controls.   
2.6.2 Treatment Results (Insurance) 
When there is a formal market alternative for individuals we find that 73.4% of 
subjects insure across all communities. This insurance rate varies on the community level, 
with the richest community Brownwood insuring the most and Port Lavaca the least. South 
Dallas the least experienced community insures at a rate between these other two Texas 
towns. Figure 3 shows the percent of subjects who purchase insurance separated my 
community. Interestingly, Port Lavaca the town with the most risk of disasters insures at 
the lowest rate of only 60%. This could be due to bailouts the community has received in 
the past when experiencing a disaster. Considering they have significant experience with 
recovery from storms, the process of a governmental bailout could be engrained in their 
perception of risk exposure and insurance.  
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Figure 3: Percent of Subjects Who Insure by Community 
 
 
 
 
To explore the decisions in depth, we conduct a probit regression model, reporting 
marginal effects in Table 7. The dependent variable is equal to one if the subject paid the 
fee (equal to $20 show-up fee) for insurance. Port Lavaca, the riskiest community in terms 
of natural disasters insures significantly less than Brownwood (the omitted community) 
confirming the possible theory of bailout experience. We also see that individuals who 
make under 20K a year are less likely to purchase insurance. This is consistent with our 
prediction, that low-income individuals may not be able to afford the insurance premium. 
Risk aversion is positively correlated with the likelihood to purchase formal market 
insurance. Purchasing the insurance takes all the risk out of the game.  
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This is inconsistent with our predictions Table 2 regarding insurance purchases. 
We expect that Port Lavaca would have the highest insurance rate considering they have 
finical access to credit, high risk factor and insurance experience. However, they had the 
lowest insurance rate and we conjecture that this is a result of governmental assistantship 
after natural disasters. Brownwood who we believed would have average insurance rate 
did have the highest insured rate of our communities. They insure more than 80% of the 
time. South Dallas who we expected to insure the least actually insures more than Port 
Lavaca.  
We next examine the impact of insurance availability on risk sharing. We examine 
individuals’ transfers in both the baseline game in comparison to the treatment. Table 8 
contains the total amount that subjects transferred to both one and two unlucky group 
members in all possible treatments. This will allow us to observe differences in the 
treatment. It is also important to distinguish between people who purchased insurance and 
those that did not. The table indicates that the availability of insurance sharply reduces 
transfers. We observe that individuals who purchase insurance transfer less, but in most 
cases transfers are also reduced by those who do not purchase insurance. This indicates 
that just offering a formal institution crowds out the informal institution. The level of 
crowding out differs by community. In the richest community, Brownwood, transfers 
decrease about 60 percent for individuals who insure which is 84% of the population. Port 
Lavaca sees the most crowding out with response to the formal institution. In South Dallas, 
the poorest community and the community with the least insurance experience, transfers 
do not fall as substantially and the least amount of crowding out occurs.  
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Table 7: Which Subjects Purchase Insurance 
Who Insures? 
DV= Who Paid Fee (Dummy=1 if Paid) 
 Insurance 
South Dallas -0.077 
 (0.07) 
Port Lavaca -0.228** 
 (0.09) 
Female 0.055 
 (0.06) 
Age 0 
 (0.00) 
Low Income -0.099+ 
 (0.06) 
Risk Aversion -0.008 
 (0.07) 
Never Save 0.006 
 (0.06) 
Altruism 0.015 
 (0.01) 
Observations 328 
χ2 12.48 
Pseudo R2 0.0307 
LnL -197.1 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
Notes: Marginal effects from a Probit Model. 
Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable equals 1 if the subject paid the fee in the 
treatment and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 Port Lavaca’s decrease in transfers indicates that the option to insure crowds out 
much of the informal risk sharing. This is interesting considering they were the community 
who purchased the least amount of insurance. This indicates that the take-up rate of 
insurance does not affect the level in which insurance crowds out the informal risk sharing. 
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This could suggest that community norms significantly affect the willingness to purchase 
insurance. 
 
 
Table 8: Amount Sent in Baseline and Treatment All Communities 
Total Amount Sent – Baseline and Treatment 
 Baseline Transfer 
Insurance 
Purchased 
Insurance Not 
Purchased 
 ($75) ($75) ($75) 
 One Loser 
Two 
Loser 
One 
Loser 
Two 
Loser 
One 
Loser 
Two Loser 
Port Lavaca 
17.63 
(12.49) 
(71) 
22.83 
(17.31) 
(71) 
4.85 
(9.83) 
(26) 
6.04 
(12.93) 
(26) 
6.56 
(10.60) 
(16) 
10.00 
(13.78) 
(16) 
Brownwood 
16.60 
(11.25) 
(98) 
22.55 
(17.69) 
(98) 
5.38 
(9.21) 
(46) 
10.00 
(17.73) 
(46) 
16.67 
(10.61) 
(9) 
21.11 
(12.44) 
(9) 
South Dallas 
18.68 
(11.63) 
(201) 
28.10 
(17.19) 
(201) 
12.64 
(11.06) 
(70) 
17.95 
(16.78) 
(70) 
10.13 
(9.22) 
(30) 
15.60 
(15.80) 
(30) 
Standard Deviation reported in top parentheses followed by number of subjects in bottom parentheses 
 
 
 
Figure 4 allows us to observe the crowding out insurance availability creates 
graphically. We can see that for all communities the transfers are less if the individual did 
not pay the show-up fee to insure themselves a positive outcome.  
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Figure 4: Transfers by Community and Insurance Purchase 
 
  
 
 
If a subject chooses not to pay the $20 fee for insurance to insure themselves a 
positive outcome, they are left to play the baseline game. For this reason, we could expect 
that the transfers from individuals, who do not purchase insurance, would be similar to 
those from the baseline. Figure 5 shows graphically that this is not the case. Transfers are 
reduced significantly when there is just an option of formal insurance. We can see given 
the p-values that all the differences are significant other than Brownwood, the wealthiest 
community. These community still transfers’ larger positive amounts even though there is 
a formal market alternative. They behave very similarly as in the baseline. The same holds 
true for transfers in the case of two losers in the group. (See Figure A.2 in appendix) The 
disparity in the transfers indicates that the opportunity of insurance changes behavior 
crowding out solidarity. 
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Figure 5: Baseline vs. Treatment if Insurance is Forgone 
 
 
 
 
We find that in South Dallas, transfers fall the least, and insurance does not crowd 
out the informal mechanism as much. The transfers only fall by approximately 
1
3
 for 
insured and uninsured. This indicates a greater willingness to share with or without the 
formal market alternative. This could be related to income or possibly the inexperience 
with formal financial institutions. This also strengthens the argument that risk sharing is 
occurring in poor developed areas much as it is in the developing countries.  
In Table 9 we turn to a regression analysis of the amount transferred, controlling 
for treatment, community and number of losers in-group. The dependent variable is the 
amount sent in the insurance treatments. The model contains two decisions for each 
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
A
m
o
u
n
t 
S
e
n
t 
o
u
t 
o
f 
($
7
5
)
Port Lavaca Brownwood South Dallas
Baseline vs Treatment (No Insurance Purchased)
Baseline 1 Loser Insurance 1 Loser
P-value=.0068 P-value=.2035 P-value=.0810 
 39 
 
individual – for a situation with one loser and the total sent to two losers; therefore, we 
use a random-effects panel regression. 
 
 
Table 9: Panel Regression on Amount Transferred, Treatment 
 Treatment Treatment/Fee Model 1 Model 2 
Two Losers 5.677*** 5.668*** 6.918*** 6.914*** 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.92) (0.92) 
Insurance -8.646*** -6.610*** -5.492*** -1.646 
 (0.66) (1.18) (1.54) (3.03) 
Fee Paid  -2.835* -2.645 -7.593* 
  (1.37) (1.71) (3.27) 
Two Loser 
Treatment 
  -2.259 -2.259 
   (1.99) (1.97) 
Fee Paid x Two 
Losers 
  -0.355 -0.306 
   (2.08) (2.06) 
Port Lavaca   -1.546 0.52 
   (2.45) (2.60) 
South Dallas   3.335+ 2.215 
   (2.00) (2.12) 
Insurance x PL    -7.950* 
    (3.61) 
Fee Paid x PL    4.438 
    (4.11) 
Insurance x SD    -2.869 
    (3.28) 
Fee Paid x SD    6.426+ 
    (3.61) 
Constant 17.185*** 17.187*** 15.182*** 15.320*** 
 (0.97) (0.97) (1.71) (1.77) 
Observations 787 787 787 787 
Number of id 199 199 199 199 
R
2
- Within 0.296 0.302 0.306 0.324 
R
2
-Between 0.000697 0.0000233 0.0271 0.0397 
R
2
- Overall 0.114 0.115 0.136 0.15 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
DV= Amount sent in insurance treatment 
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First, we regress on just transfers with insurance offered. Second, we add in if the 
subjects paid the fee to purchase insurance guaranteeing them a positive outcome. We 
including a dummy variable (Fee Paid=1) to denote this. Model 1 adds communities, 
including a dummy variable for both South Dallas and Port Lavaca. Model 2 includes both 
community and interaction variables. We find the treatment effects of insurance are robust 
to all controls. We also do a likelihood ratio test for Model 1 vs. Model 2 and report that 
the treatment effects are different across the communities. (LR chi2(4)=17.99, 
Prob>chi2=0.0012) 
 
 
Table 10: Summary of Predictions and Outcomes 
 Risk-Sharing Purchase Insurance 
Impact of Insurance on 
Risk-Sharing 
Port Lavaca 
-+- 
moderate 
+++ 
high 
 
Brownwood 
--- 
Low 
+-+ 
moderate 
 
South Dallas 
+++ 
high 
-+- 
Low 
 
Port Lavaca Moderate Low (61.9%) Most crowding out 
Brownwood Low High (83.6%) 
Highest crowding out if 
insurance purchased 
South Dallas High Moderate (68.6%) Least crowding out 
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Table 10 summarizes the previous predictions and overall results. The grey shaded 
are shows the predictions due to explanatory factors including credit access, risk exposure 
and insurance experience. The bottom half of Table 10 shows the results that we observed 
in the communities. We can see although the informal model was a good predictor of risk 
sharing levels, it missed the mark on insurance rates. The predictions from community 
factors were accurate with respect to the sharing behavior in the group. 
2.7 Conclusion 
By combining these rich data sets, we were able to observe the variations in sharing 
across three distinct communities when there are formal market alternatives such as 
insurance. Understanding the drivers behind this informal type of insurance or sharing 
behavior could help us understand alternatives individuals use in response to the lack of 
access to formal financial institutions. This ultimately affects poor neighborhoods or poor 
individuals, even in developed countries. We do see strong evidence that this phenomenon 
of lack of formal institutions is not isolated to less developed countries. We present strong 
evidence that it is also true for poor areas of developed countries, within our study. We 
find that just the availability of a formal institution crowds out the informal institution. 
This happens by transfers decreasing significantly to the less fortunate group members. 
This was not only true for people who purchased the insurance, but also those who 
declined paying for a guaranteed outcome. Communities varied on the level of crowding 
out experienced due to the formal institution’s presence within the actual community. We 
also examined the rates at which people insured. By identifying who insures, we could 
understand possible motivation of individuals who do not purchase insurance. These 
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individuals are likely using an informal structure to mitigate against bad outcomes, much 
like we see in our experiment. Community norms significantly affect the willingness to 
purchase insurance. This effect is most prominent in lower income areas. We provide 
evidence of this through the variation in individuals that purchase insurance within our 
three communities. We see that most of our subjects do purchase insurance, however the 
26% that do not purchase the insurance are in significantly worse shape with the informal 
sharing when there is a formal option available. This is due to the formal institution 
crowding out the informal sharing. This creates concern for individuals that are using risk 
sharing as an alternative to formal market options like insurance. If individuals within 
their community began to partake in the formal institutions, the informal safety net will 
develop large holes, leaving community members falling through. This is especially true 
in low-income poor urban neighborhoods.  
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3. DID THE ICE BUCKET CHALLENGE DRAIN THE PHILANTHROPIC 
RESERVOIR?: EVIDENCE FROM A REAL DONATION EXPERIMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
  Charitable organizations often need imaginative methods to increase donations. In 
the charitable giving literature, there is a heavy emphasis on the efficiency of various 
methods to increase donations. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the impact 
that successful campaigns have on other charitable causes. In this paper, we ask, “When a 
charitable organization conducts a successful campaign, where do the donations come 
from?” This paper fills a void in the literature by studying not only the effects of successful 
campaigns on contributions to the targeted charity, but also the unintended consequences 
to other non-targeted charitable organizations.  On a social level, we investigate the effects 
of charitable giving campaigns on other charitable causes, which have relevant policy 
implications for practitioners.  
Recently, charitable organizations have taken to social media in force. In the 
presence of a targeted media campaign, charitable contributions should rise, as shown by 
the success of multiple campaigns.  One example of a successful campaign is “Water is 
Life,” where the charity coined the hashtag “#FirstWorldProblems” and created videos of 
people in developing countries stating complaints that exist  in a first world country. This 
campaign raised awareness as well as funds to provide clean water to those in need. 
Similarly, UNICEF ran a social media campaign, “Likes don’t save lives,” informing 
possible supporters of how to donate to vaccinate children, and urging them to donate, not 
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to just “like” or share the post. This media campaign was a successful strategy, motivating 
people to act by contributing dollars to the cause.  
More recently, in the summer of 2014, social media was inundated with videos of 
people pouring ice and cold water over their heads to participate in the Ice Bucket 
Challenge. The Ice Bucket Challenge was a campaign intended to raise awareness and 
donations for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) or Lou Gehrig’s disease. The Ice Bucket 
Challenge was very effective and it is estimated that more than 2.4 million people 
participated in this peer-to-peer fundraising challenge. In this campaign, recipients are 
challenged by their friends, family or co-workers to dump a bucket of ice water over their 
head within 24 hours. If they do not accept the challenge, they donate $100 dollars to the 
charity that is responsible for funding research on ALS (Phing, 2014). Many celebrities 
participated, including Robert Downey Jr., Jennifer Aniston, Leonardo DiCaprio, Oprah, 
50 Cent, Kermit the Frog, and many more. This challenge generated over $115 million 
dollars for ALS, and raised awareness for this incurable disease (ALS website). Total 
donations were twenty times larger than what was raised in the previous year.  
Although a large body of research has investigated the effects of various 
campaigns on their intended charities on both the intensive and extensive margins, little is 
known about the impact these campaigns have on giving to other charities.  A successful 
campaign may attract new donors and additional spending by existing donors, yet, it is 
unclear where the additional donations come from. At one extreme individuals may 
increase donations without decreasing donations to other charities, while at the other, all 
of the increase in donations to the targeted charity come from decreasing donations to 
 45 
 
other charities. The latter case crowds out giving to the untargeted philanthropic 
organization. As a result, the charity with the successful campaign creates a positive boost, 
but does so through possibly devastating effects for other charities.  
Our research employs a “real donation” laboratory experiment (Eckel and 
Grossman, 1996) to test whether a successful campaign reduces giving to other charities. 
It is important to understand the impact on other organizations to understand its true effect.  
William MacAskill, writing for Quartz news outlet, emphasizes that, “$3 million in 
donations doesn’t appear out of a vacuum. Because people on average are limited in how 
much they’re willing to donate to good causes, if someone donates $100 to ALS 
association, he or she will likely donate less to other charities”  (MacAskill, 2014). 
MacAskill calls this type of behavior “funding cannibalism.” 
  To investigate this possibility, we measure the effect on donations to other charities 
when a campaign for a single charity is run using a controlled lab experiment. It would be 
difficult if not impossible to determine the impact of a real campaign in the field.  
Specifically, it would be difficult to obtain the necessary data needed to examine the 
effects of a campaign, as we would need to obtain individuals donations to the targeted 
charity, every other charitable donation for many years, their political contributions, as 
well as miscellaneous gifts including money to friends, family and the homeless. This data 
is not readily available, and using survey methods is suspect because individuals misreport 
contributions. On the other hand, using an experiment in the lab allows us to control 
various influences in the environment to identify whether the donations to the successful 
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charity campaign are coming from individuals increasing their budget for charitable 
giving, or if they are instead taking money that they would have given to other charities. 
In Study 1, we test whether a successful campaign crowds out giving to other 
charities; subjects participate in two dictator games with three charitable recipients. In the 
baseline, subjects have the opportunity to allocate funds between themselves and three 
charities.  Then subjects participate in one of three sessions. In each session, we select one 
of the charities and conduct a video campaign. After participants see the video campaign, 
we “challenge” subjects to give to that charity. Participants are then asked to make the 
same decision as the baseline, allocating money between themselves and the three 
charities.  By comparing the subjects’ allocations before and after the campaign, we 
measure the effect of the campaign on giving, both to the target of the campaign and the 
other two charities.   We conjecture that if crowding out occurs at the basic level in the 
lab, then the effects will be exponentially larger in the field. This is because charities 
would use campaigns that employ methods that would increase participation such as social 
media. The crowding out in the controlled lab experiment will not be able to capture the 
network and social pressure aspect.  Using this experimental design, we investigate the 
question: When a charitable organization conducts a successful campaign, where do the 
donations come from?  
To answer this question, we must first create a successful campaign. To verify this 
goal, we test if the subjects significantly increased contributions to the charity that ran a 
campaign. We do succeed in running a successful campaign for the charities. We see an 
increase in giving to the targeted charity across all sessions. To examine where the increase 
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in contributions came from, we measure how overall giving was impacted. By comparing 
total donations in the baseline and treatment, we can identify if individuals increased their 
charitable budget, or if they reallocated funds from other causes. In all three sessions, we 
find total giving remained unchanged in the treatment. That is, the increase in giving to 
the target charity came entirely at the expense of the other charities. This finding provides 
initial evidence of a crowding out effect.   
 In a Study 2, we investigate the effects of priming general charitable behavior. 
Using the same design as before, subjects allocate money between themselves and the 
same three charities. However, subjects do not see a targeted video campaign about a 
particular charity; instead, they see a video highlighting general giving. By priming 
general giving behavior, we observe if this generates an increase in total donations. 
Looking at the sum of individual donation in the baseline and treatment we find that 
subjects do not increases their total giving significantly. Priming general philanthropic 
behavior does not change subject’s donation behavior significantly.  
3.2 Literature Review 
To our knowledge, there have been no published works on our particular research 
question. There have been many experiments involving charitable giving, but none 
involving the crowding out effects on net charity contributions because of a charity 
campaign. Much of the charitable giving literature investigates mechanisms that enhance 
giving. A number of papers have investigated matching and rebates as methods for 
increasing donations to charitable causes (Eckel and Grossman 2008a, Eckel et al. 2005,  
Eckel and Grossman 2003, Karlan and List 2006, Karlan and List 2011, Meier 2007, Chen, 
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Li and MacKieMason 2006, Meer 20014, Huck and Rasul 2011, Rondeau and List 2008). 
This literature finds that matching donations increases overall contributions and that 
matching tends to outperform rebates with regard to increasing donations. Charities can 
offer matching to increase contributions but it is not clear if the increases come at the 
expense of other charities. If individuals have a giving budget, an increase in one 
contribution should come at the expense of another planned contribution.  
Similarly, social information and leadership have been explored as a method to 
increase contributions (Frey and Meier 2004, Croson and Shang 2008, Shang and Croson 
2009, Gneezy, Nelson and Brown 2010, List 201). This literature indicates that 
information about other’s donation behavior increases contributions and has merit to the 
individual’s donation decision. There is literature showing seed money is beneficial to 
increase fundraising (List and Lucking-Reiler 2002, List 2011, Andreoni 1998). Another 
strand of research looks at campaigns effects on future giving. If individuals have an 
opportunity to donate, and never be solicited for another donation, contributions increase. 
Furthermore, individuals do not choose to opt out of future solicitations. Just providing 
people the ability to opt out increases the number of donors and the amounts they give to 
the cause (Mullaney et. al 2015). Impacts of future charitable giving are examined when 
charitable causes offered matching for donors (Meier 2007). Although multiple ways have 
been studied on how to increase donor giving, no research has explored where the increase 
in donations are coming from.  There is research addressing what happens to future 
donations within the same organization, but a large hole exists in examining future impacts 
on other charitable causes.  
 49 
 
Researchers have also observed the phenomena of multiple years with a stagnant 
percent of GDP being directed to charitable causes (List 2011, Perry 2013). In the United 
States, individuals spent a total of $358.38 billion dollars in 2014 on donations to 
charitable causes (CNBC, 2015). This amounts to two percent of income as a percentage 
of the US GDP. The percentage that Americans give to charities has remained flat over 
the last 40 years (List 2011, Perry 2013). This suggests that Americans are not increasing 
total charitable contributions as a percentage of income. Thus, there is initial empirical 
evidence supporting our hypotheses regarding crowding out. This stagnant rate of giving 
indicates that if a campaign is run, it might not cause total charitable contributions to 
fluctuate.  
3.3 Experimental Design 
3.3.1. Study 1 
In Study 1, our experiment is a within-subjects design, where each subject 
participated in both the baseline and the treatment. The baseline game is a dictator game 
with charity recipients. Subjects are given a $15 endowment and the opportunity to 
allocate the funds between themselves and three unique Texas charities. The only 
restriction is that donations plus the amount kept by the subject must add up to $15, and 
any money contributed must be in whole dollar increments. In all three sessions, the 
subjects were endowed with the same budget ($15) and made the same decisions as before. 
However, before they made their allocations, the subjects were shown a short video about 
one of the three charities. This short video is a charitable campaign, and is the main 
intervention we use in the experiment. In the video, an undergraduate student relays 
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relevant information about one of the three charities, including information and statistics 
about the organization and their success in helping their unique cause in Texas (See 
Appendix C).  All three videos provided similar information about the targeted charity and 
the language in the videos is taken from the charity’s websites. The information and data 
about each charity was collected from the charity’s official website. The order in which 
we assigned the charities to be targeted was chosen at random before any experimental 
sessions.6 We ran three sessions, one for each charity.   This video was played on a central 
projector in the front of the room after the subjects completed the baseline decision.  
Before the subjects saw the video, the lead experimenter made a short speech getting the 
subjects attention and letting them know an important message would follow. After the 
video was played, the experiment challenged the subjects to give now. The allocation 
decisions in the treatment are the same as in the baseline.  
After the subject completed both the baseline and the treatment, the student 
monitor was brought to the front of the room and one of the two decisions was chosen for 
payment by a die roll.7  If the monitor rolled a 1, 2 or 3 subjects were paid for the baseline 
decision. If a 4, 5 or 6 were rolled the treatment decision was paid. This was announced 
to the participants. Subjects were paid the remainder of their endowment not donated (and 
a $5 show up fee); donations to the charities were totaled and donated online. While the 
experimental team organized payment, the subjects filled out a brief demographic survey 
                                                 
6 Using a random draw without replacement, and before any sessions were run, the order was decided for 
all sessions.  
7 The monitor was chosen at random at the beginning of the experiment. She/he did not make allocations 
and received $20 for their participation.  
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(see appendix D). The survey included questions about charitable giving behavior and the 
Self-Report Altruism Scale (SRA) (Rushton, 1981). When subjects finished the survey, 
they were taken to the payment window where they received their earnings in person 
privately.  
The subjects in this experiment were at no point forced to give or donate to any of 
the three charities. The experimenter speech and informational video in the treatment of 
each session was used to simulate the social pressure often inherent in a non-profit’s giving 
campaign. This allowed the video campaign to simulate effects of a non-profit charity’s 
fundraising campaign on donations to other non-profit charities.  
Procedure 
Our experiment had 67 individuals participate across three sessions. All subjects 
were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) In each session, we ran a campaign for one 
of the three charities. Table 11 summarizes the distribution of subjects in each session.  
 
 
Table 11: Subject Breakdown by Session 
Session Treated Charity Subjects 
1 Feeding Texas 24 
2 
Texas Campaign for the 
Environment 
22 
3 Operation Kindness 21 
Total  67 
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All sessions were run at the Economics Research Laboratory at Texas A&M University 
in November 2014. All subjects received a $5 for showing up. We restricted participation 
to only undergraduate students who had not participated in charitable giving experiments 
before.  
When subjects arrived to the Economic Research Laboratory, they checked in and 
received subject identification numbers and waited until the session began to proceed into 
the lab. The subjects received the experimental materials (see appendix D) upon entering 
the lab, which included experimental instructions, charity information and decision sheets. 
After reading the basic instructions of the experiment (see appendix D), the experimenters 
chose one participant at random to act as the monitor; their duties entailed ensuring 
experimenters followed all protocols as while checking for accuracy and donation to the 
charities. The monitor was brought to the front and given a protocol sheet that they had to 
sign off on before receiving their payment of $20 including the $5 show-up payment. 
Average earnings were $14.098 with $5.91 being sent on average to all three charities. The 
monitor oversaw the payment of subjects as well as the payment online to the three 
charitable organizations for the decision (baseline or treatment) that was selected for 
payment.  
Charities 
We selected a set of charities that would appeal to our college-student subjects; 
one charity that dealt with animals, one that dealt with hungry Texans and finally a charity 
                                                 
8 Including the $5 show-up fee.  
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that worked with the environment. We chose charities at the state level, to ensure no local 
charities were chosen that could be favoured or better known by our subject pool. The 
charities that were chosen are listed below: 
Operation Kindness (OK) is a nonprofit no-kill animal shelter in North Texas. Established 
in 1976 OK is the largest no-kill shelter in the state. This charity helps with the homing of 
misplaced and surrendered pets through shelters and fostering animals.   
Feeding Texas (FT) is a nonprofit charity whose mission is to alleviate hunger in Texas. 
This charity was formerly the Texas Food Bank, and the charity uses multiple food banks 
to help solve hunger. 
Texas Campaign for the Environment (TCE) is a nonprofit charity that focuses on 
educating and informing Texans about the environment. They also focus on pollution and 
public health in Texas. It works in both local policy and state policy areas trying to make 
Texas environmentally better. 
3.4 Results 
To identify whether the media campaign was successful, we observe the 
contributions to the targeted charities before and after the campaign. Figure 6 shows mean 
contributions to the target charity, with all three session pooled together.  In the baseline 
decision, the mean contribution to the targeted charity was $2.10. After subjects were 
exposed to the campaign, the contributions to the targeted charity increased to $2.70.   
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Figure 6: Mean Contributions to Targeted Charity 
 
 
 
 
The baseline contributions are significantly different from the treatment 
contributions. (p=.0113).  We confirm this result by observing the contributions for the 
subsample of subjects who contributed to the charity, leaving out subjects who kept all 
funds for themselves in both decisions. Our result is consistent when we only consider 
individuals who made transfers to the charitable organizations (See appendix B, Figure 
B.1). The result is also robust with regard to contingency giving. This indicates that the 
result is not being driven by new donors that are entering the charitable market after the 
campaign. The levels of increase depend on the charity themselves. In Table 12, we report 
the p-values from a t-test for mean contributions to each charity before and after the 
treatment. The shaded boxes indicate the targeted charity for each session. We see a 
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significant difference in two of the three charities. All charities saw an increase in 
donations9.  
 
 
Table 12: P-Values for Mean Contributions Before and After Treatment 
Charity Session 1 (FT) Session 2 (TCE) Session 3 (OK) 
FT P=0.0650+ P=0.1339 P=0.2803 
TCE P=0.2127 P=0.5758 P=0.1048 
OK P=0.0412* P=0.4064 P=0.0812+ 
P values for t-test of means between control and treatment. 
*** p<0.001, ***p<0.01, *p<0.05,+p<0.10 
 
 
 
In Table 13, we report results from a panel regression.  The dependent variable is 
individual contributions to the targeted charity. Each individual has two observations, one 
for the baseline decision and one for the contribution in the treatment. In Model 1, we see 
that post-campaign individuals sent $0.597 cents more than in the baseline on average. In 
Model 2, we control for gender, age and weekly spending. The results remain robust with 
individuals sending $0.591 more. We do not find any significant demographic indicators 
for increased contributions.  
                                                 
9 The individual contribution differences are reported in Graphs A3, A4, and A5 in the appendix. 
Here they are shown by sum contribution as well as mean level contributions to each charity by 
session.  
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       Table 13: Panel Regression on Amount Sent to Targeted Charity 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel Regression: DV = Giving to Target Charity 
Model  I II III 
Post-Campaign 0.597** 0.591* 0.591* 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) 
Female  0.481 0.474 
  (0.60) (0.59) 
Age  0.359 0.371 
  (0.35) (0.35) 
Weekly Spending  -0.184 -0.17 
  (0.20) (0.20) 
Donations Last Year   -0.025 
   (0.58) 
GSS Altruism   -0.163 
   (0.58) 
Constant 2.104*** 1.39 1.448 
 (0.29) (1.04) (1.21) 
Observations 134 132 132 
Number of individuals 67 66 66 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, 
+ p<0.10 
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In Model 3, we use additional controls including a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one if the subject donated money to a charity within the past year. We find no 
significant correlation between past giving behavior and giving in our experiment. We 
also use the GSS altruism measure10 and find no significant correlation using this standard 
survey altruism method. We do see that the result of an increase of .591 cents remains 
consistent even after controlling for all the variables.   
Next, we identify where the increase in funds came from. Subjects gave 39 percent 
of their endowments to charities in the first decision. This indicates that the mean for total 
giving was $5.89 out of a $15.00 endowment in the baseline. After the video campaign, 
subjects gave $5.87, still 39% of their available funds. Figure 7 offers a graphical 
representation of the unchanged giving budget. The amounts are indistinguishable from 
each other (p=0.90). 
We find the subjects donate the same total amount in both the baseline and 
treatment. This indicates that total giving was unchanged due to the campaign. If a 
successful campaign had increased an individual’s donation budget, we would have seen 
mean treatment giving greater than baseline contributions. Instead, we find that subjects 
are reallocating funds from another charity after exposure to the video campaign.  The 
increase in giving to the targeted charity comes entirely from reduced donations to other 
charities.11 In Figure 8, we test the difference in the distributions of contributions in pre-
                                                 
10 See Appendix D for GSS altruism question. These were given as part of the post survey. 
11 The individual variations between sessions can be seen in Appendix B, figures: B.3, B.4, and 
B.5 
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campaign and post campaign decisions. If new donors were entering the market, the 
contribution would see a shift to the right and the distributions would be different. The 
distributions are indistinguishable from each other using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(p=1.0000). The amount that individuals are sending to the charities are distributed the 
same before and after the video campaign. This provides solid evidence that subjects are 
just reallocated the money that they donated in favor of the targeted charity. This result 
indicates that the extensive margin behavior is unchanged.  
 
 
Figure 7: Mean Total Giving to All Charities  
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Figure 8: Distributions of Total Contributions Pre and Post Campaign 
 
 
 
 
 
We run a panel regression to confirm that the charitable budget is unchanged. By 
using similar models as before, we can identify whether the result is being driven by any 
particular demographic characteristic, past charitable behavior, or altruism. Table 14 
offers results from a panel regression. The dependent variable is total contribution. We 
find that post-campaign the budget decreases by $0.03, although the decrease is not 
significant. This result proves robust when adding in demographic information (Model 2) 
and previous donation and altruism (Model 3). This result holds when looking at each 
session separately. We see all target charities get an increase in contributions from the 
media campaign. In each session, the increase comes at the expense of the non-targeted 
charities.  
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Table 14: Panel Regression on Total Amount Sent to All Charities 
Panel Regression: DV = Total Contributions 
Post-Campaign -0.0294 -0.076 -0.076 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 
Female  1.421 1.432 
  (1.09) (1.09) 
Age  0.718 0.753 
  (0.45) (0.47) 
Weekly Spending  0.004 0.041 
  (0.43) (0.44) 
Donate Last Year   0.184 
   (1.18) 
GSS Altruism   -0.324 
   (1.25) 
Constant 5.896*** 3.389* 3.138 
 (0.54) (1.60) (2.45) 
Observations 134 132 132 
Number of id 67 66 66 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. *** p<0.001, ** 
p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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3.5 Study 2: Design and Results 
After running the first three sessions (OK, TCE, FT), we established that 
individuals have a set budget of funds they allocate to all charitable causes.  The 
motivation behind this design was that a general campaign would reduce the apparent 
tradeoffs between the three charities. Ultimately, we wanted to see if priming general 
charitable behavior would increase total giving.  
For the robustness check, we created a fourth session based on the same design as 
before.  In each of the two periods, they again decide how to allocate 15 dollars among 
themselves and three charities. In the second period, we use a different intervention. 
Instead of using a video targeting a specific charity, we prime general giving behavior 
using a Texas A&M service project, The Big Event.  
  The Big Event is where students do service projects for the community for one day 
in the spring semester. These projects can include raking leaves, painting houses, building 
fences, volunteering at an animal shelter, building handicap ramps, and many other 
various projects. In 2014, 21,000 students participated in the event. With over 43 percent 
of the student body participating, this indicates that the cause is widely known throughout 
the campus. The Big Event has the mission to promote campus and community unity. This 
particular service project is the largest one-day student run service project in the world. 
Due to the success, it has been expanded to over 110 other schools worldwide. The 
treatment we offered subjects was a video, the same as before, but with information about 
the Big Event and the plethora of things, it does for the community.   
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The second study was run in July and August 2015 at the Economic Research Lab 
at Texas A&M. Average earnings for subjects were $14.07, including a show-up fee, with 
an average payment of $5.93 sent to charity. We had 42 subjects participate in these 
sessions.  
In Figure 9, we see the total contributions for both the first three sessions and the 
fourth session (Study 2).  Directionally we see an increase under the general charitable 
campaign, although it is not significant (p=0.172). Subjects sent $5.76 in the baseline 
compared to $6.12 after watching the video informing them of the Big Event.   
Considering Study 2 was run eight months later, we want to verify that the 
behavior we observe is the same as the previous three sessions. In Table 15, we report the 
p-values for Study 1 (sessions 1, 2 and 3) against Study 2 with regard to pre-campaign 
contributions, post-campaign contributions as well as change in contribution. We find no 
significant differences in charitable contributions in the first decision before any video 
was played. This is also true with total giving levels after the videos. We find no difference 
in the behavior of subjects in Study 1 or Study 2. Finally, we observe the difference in 
giving pre-campaign and post-campaign in both studies. We find no difference in the 
deduction or increase in contributions between the two studies.       
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Figure 9: Study 1 and Study 2 Mean Total Giving to All Charities 
  
 
 
        
Table 15: T-Test Study 1 versus Study 2 
 Study 1 vs. Study 2 
Pre-Campaign Giving p=0.872 
Post-Campaign Giving p=0.770 
Change in Contribution p=0.292 
 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the distributions of change in donations in the first three sessions 
compared to the distribution of the change in donations in the fourth session, study two. 
Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we find no significant difference (p=1.0000).  This 
indicates that individuals in all four sessions had similar behavior in reallocation before 
and after the media campaign. Examining study 2, we conclude that running a general 
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charitable campaign does not increase contributions to the charities significantly. This 
strengthens the original finding that individuals have a charitable budget, and successful 
campaigns that target a specific charity create substitution between charitable causes. 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of Changes in Total Giving by Study 
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3.6 Discussion 
In our lab experiment, we find significant crowding out of donations from non-
target charities. We find people are not increasing their total charitable expenditure after 
receiving a video campaign. Thus, the total philanthropic reservoir (charity budget) 
remains the same before and after a successful campaign. This is consistent with historic 
data, which illustrates that charitable giving, as a percent of GDP, has remained consistent 
at 2 percent over the last four decades in the United States. The experimental media 
campaign increased giving to the targeted charity; but did so at a cost to the fundraising 
efforts of others.  Subjects reallocated funds from other charities to the targeted charity, 
indicating that donors viewed the charitable causes as substitutes.  We also find priming 
for general charitable behavior does not increase giving. We fail to find a manipulation 
that increases subjects’ charitable budget.   
Our experiment confirms an interesting phenomenon. Individuals are redirecting 
their charitable expenditures and crowding out giving to others. This is an important factor 
to consider when designing campaigns to increase charitable gifts. When a charity, like 
the ALS foundation has a successful campaign, increasing donations by over $100 million 
dollars, this surge in money likely comes at the expense of other organizations.  
Extrapolating our lab results to the field, it is likely we would discover that other charities 
contributions suffered at a magnitude similar to the success of the ALS campaign.  
Ultimately, charities should consider the crowding out effect when organizing their 
next campaign. The timing and effectiveness of a charity’s campaign could depend largely 
on the efforts of other organizations. Considering our research indicates donors have strict 
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charitable budgets, it could be beneficial to make sure that you run a campaign early in 
the fiscal year, to make sure you achieve some potential donors giving budget.  Charities 
that run successful campaigns could be doing so at the expense of other causes.  For 
instance, the ALS surge in donations could have drained an organization that works 
towards a cause affecting a larger proportion of the population such as hunger or cancer. 
In turn, this creates a moral hazard in social media campaigns that could in turn actually 
harm society indirectly. The fact that we were able to demonstrate these results in the 
laboratory means that the effects of a peer influenced, social media campaign outside of 
the laboratory would likely to be greater and more significant. Typically, campaigns can 
use social influence and networking to increase the effectiveness. This indicates that 
removing these factors would ultimately make our lab experiment show the lower bounds 
of possible consequences of a successful campaign. The long-term effects of running a 
widespread campaign like this are unknown.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we report evidence from a laboratory experiment that examines the 
impact of a successful targeted media campaign on overall levels of charitable giving. 
Through our design and analysis, we detect our hypothesized “crowding out effect” on the 
non-targeted charities. Our results indicate that there is a statistically significant effect of 
crowding out from non-targeted charities. We find that while overall levels of giving 
remaining constant, non-targeted charities suffered when compared to their baseline 
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earnings. We also explore the effect of priming general giving behavior and find no 
increase in total money allocated to causes.  
Future work is needed to examine the impact of the substitution effect on charities 
when related causes are being targeted. For example, if you run a successful campaign for 
an animal shelter, how does that campaign affect donations to other animal rescue 
organizations. This would help us gain a deeper understanding of the substitutability of 
charities in the eye of the donor. While offering insights into the crowding out we see 
between unrelated charitable causes.  
Our findings come at a time when questions about social media giving campaigns 
have piqued significant attention in both the press and economic literature. Our 
experimental work fills a void about effects of campaigning on total charitable 
expenditures as well as its influence on other charitable organizations. This experiment 
offers insight to practitioners on the impact that targeted campaigns have on charitable 
fundraising. Considering the seasonal nature of charitable contributions, one could 
imagine how our results could have a large impact on running a campaigns and their 
timing.  
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4. THE EFFECTS OF PUNISHMENT ON COOPERATION IN SIMPLE GAMES 
4.1 Introduction 
In standard games, a distinct effect can be seen on cooperation between subjects 
when social norm mechanisms are introduced.  Interestingly, the implementation of the 
ability of a group to enforce social norms, through punishment, has different effects on the 
public goods game and on the trust game. In a standard public goods game, the 
implementation of a punishment mechanism increased contributions and cooperation 
between subjects in general. In a standard trust game, however, the implementation of a 
punishment mechanism reduced trust and trustworthiness between subjects.   
Public goods games have been used to simulate a public good context in which the 
dominant strategy is free riding. When subjects are given the option to punish counterparts 
by decreasing their earnings after public good contributions are revealed, literature shows 
a significant increase of contributions (Fehr and Gachter 2002).  There also appears to be 
no significant importance whether one person or all persons are given the opportunity to 
punish (O’Gorman et. Al 2008). Additionally, people will enforce social norms even at a 
significant cost to themselves, due to either emotional responses or forward thinking long-
term strategy (Carpenter 2007). However, contributions are not affected by group size. If 
a subject is the designated punisher within a group, this leads to an increase in punishment, 
even when this is not a profit maximizing strategy (Devlin-Foltz and Lim 2008). 
By contrast, trust games exhibit results that are antithetic from those of public 
goods games, when the option of punishment is included. Punishment tends to decrease 
levels of altruistic behavior such as trust and trustworthiness as seen in trust games. (Fehr 
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and Rockenbach 2003). Whereas public goods games see increases in contributions with 
punishment, trust games see decrease in both the trusting behavior of the first mover as 
well as the trustworthiness of the second mover when punishment is available.  In a trust 
game in which the threat of punishment is used increase trusting behavior, it has been 
shown that if the option of punishment is available, but not used, trustworthiness increases. 
However if the threat of punishment is used, trust is low. This means that the lack of 
punishment as a factor leads to lower contributions (Fehr and List 2004). 
There are important distinctions to be made in attempting to explain the disparity 
between the effects of punishment in the public goods game and the trust game. These two 
games are often structured differently from one another and it could be for this reason that 
we see this difference. The aim of this paper is to discover if the structure and design of 
the games themselves are influencing the disparity in punishment effects. We will explain 
these two games briefly to understand the structure of these simple incentivized games. 
The standard Public Goods game (hereafter PGG) is played in groups (typically 3 
or more).  Each participant has an endowment and can contribute any portion into a group 
account simultaneously. Any tokens that the participant does not contribute are places into 
an individual account with a 1:1 return ratio. The amount in the group account is then 
multiplied by a certain amount (called the multiplier) and divided equally between all 
participants in the group. The equal division among all group members leads to an equal 
redistribution between everyone regardless of the initial contribution. An important design 
feature of the PGG is that each token contributed to the group account yields less than one 
token to the contribution individual. Thus, if everyone contributes an equal number of 
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tokens to the group account, everyone is better off. This creates a socially optimum 
solution for all players to contribute all tokens into the group account. However, since 
each token contributed yields less than one token, if all players are profit maximizing and 
rational, the Nash Equilibrium is that no one contributes any tokens to the group account. 
Typically, the PGG is repeated over several rounds. 
The Trust game (hereafter TG) is played with in groups of two with sequential 
movement. This game was developed by Berg et al. in 1995. This results in a distinctive 
first mover and a second mover. This is a distinctive difference from the PGG. In the TG 
each player has an equal endowment. In the TG the first mover sends a portion of her 
endowment to the second mover. This amount sent is multiplied by a number greater that 
1 (typically 3). The second mover receives the multiplied amount and can choose how 
much to return to the first mover. The second mover can also choose any of the multiplied 
monies received as well as their initial endowment if preferred. With the second mover, 
choosing the reallocation of funds makes the redistribution mechanism have the potential 
of being unequal. Due to the redistribution, game theory predicts that the second move 
should not return any amount if they are profit maximizing and rational. This results in a 
Nash equilibrium that the first mover does not exhibit trusting behavior (sends nothing) 
and the second mover sends nothing in return.  
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Table 16: Original Game Structure: Key Differences Between Games 
Public Goods (PGG) Trust (TG) 
Repeating One-Shot 
Simultaneous Contributions Sequential Contributions 
Equal Redistribution Mechanism Unequal Redistribution Mechanism 
More than 2 players 2 players 
 
 
 
To tease apart the opposite effects of punishment in the TG and PGG, I manipulate 
the games to be as similar as possible to each other. Table 16 identifies the key elements 
if the standard original games. To do this we manipulate the PGG and the TG to mimic 
each other as close as possible.  The only feature of the design that we did not change was 
the redistribution mechanism. The reason the redistribution was unchanged is that this 
ultimately differentiated the games. This results in the games being parallel on all levels 
other than how the players receive the distribution after contributions. Table 17, identifies 
the modified games using a 2x2 design. Using a 2x2 experimental design, I can examine 
the games in both sequential and simultaneous movement. This allows the games to be 
more like each other with respect to the individual’s decision and movement. I also 
manipulate the number of times the game is played, allowing me to observe the impact of 
playing the games for one period vs. multiple periods with respect to punishment effects. 
The expectation is punishment would affect cooperation in both games in the same way 
once the changes were made and the games were similar. If the changes result in similar 
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effects of punishment, the results would indicate that the original disparities in punishment 
effects are due to the structures and designs of the original games.  
 
 
Table 17: 2x2 Design Matrix 
 Sequential Contribution  Simultaneous Contribution  
One- Shot Sequential One-shot 
(Similar to original TG) 
Simultaneous One- shot 
Repeated Sequential Repeated (5 Rounds) Simultaneous Repeated (5 Rounds) 
(Similar to Original PGG) 
 
 
 
 Using the four treatments in the design allow an analysis to decipher what 
is causing the punishment disparities. Allowing punishment in each treatment, I 
manipulate one factor at a time allowing identification of potential causes of the different 
punishment effects. After running all combinations, I find that introducing a punishment 
mechanism increases cooperation in the repeated public goods game as the literature 
shows. However, in the one-time PGG we do not see an increase in contributions after 
punishment is available. This is more similar to what we see in the trust game. In the trust 
game there is never an environment that creates an increase in trust and trustworthiness 
with the availability of punishment. This indicates that the disparity in punishment effects 
is not driven by the difference in game design. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Many researchers have discussed the effects of various changes made, within these 
two games, on contribution levels. In the TG literature, punishment has been observed 
under multiple situations. Within the trust literature, it is well known that sanction and 
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punischment destroy cooperation between players (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003). The 
negative impacts of such sanctions have been explored in multiple settings. (Fehr and List 
2004) conducted a one-shot trust game in which each subject was given the option to 
punish their counterparts. Each subject was asked to contribute and elect a threshold of 
acceptable returns from his or her counterpart. If the threshold was not met, costless 
punishment was inflicted by reducing the earnings of the player that did not contribute the 
appropriate amount.  (Houser et. Al 2008) conducted an investment trust game in which a 
first mover was asked to contribute and make a request for a particular percentage returned 
from the second mover.  A sanction could be inflicted if the requested percent returned 
was not met. This sanction could come from the investor (first-mover) or nature 
(experimenter). The researchers find that punishment incentives affect returns, but not the 
intentions. They also find that sanctions increase cooperation if the return request are 
small, but decrease cooperation when the return request are high. The sanctions result in 
negative effects of sanction id the request are large, ultimately resulting in hindrance.  
(Charness et. Al 2008) is, to our knowledge, the only one to successfully encourage 
higher contributions in a trust game with punishment. Charness's subjects were asked to 
play a standard trust game in one treatment, and in the other treatment, punishment was 
allowed. In this game, subjects were allowed to vote for a third party punisher. The result 
was that each participant, the first mover and the second mover, contributed more because 
of a third party punisher being present. Third party punishment is different from the design 
that we are going to implement. Through our design, we will be able to identify if the 
punishment is as effective coming from one of the participating parties, instead of an 
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elected third party. If a third party is the punisher than they are able to examine both 
parties’ contributions and reactions to the other parties’ contributions or returns. 
Therefore, third party punishment is quite different considering that they are able to 
identify both individuals’ outcomes and act accordingly, and both parties participating in 
the game can be punished. In our design, only one party, the first mover will be able to 
punish.  
(O'Gorman et al., 2009) conducted a public goods game in which the number of 
punishers in a group was manipulated across treatments. Each group consisted of four 
persons. During one treatment, only one subject out of four was randomly selected to have 
the option to punish anybody else in the group. During the other treatment, all four subjects 
had the option to punish each other. The number of punishers in a group showed no 
significant impact on the total level of contributions. The existence of punishment, as 
expected, did significantly increase contributions. 
Fehr (2002) conducted a repeating public goods game in which a cost of 
punishment was imposed upon the punisher. In spite of the costliness of punishment, it 
was found that subjects found it worth the cost to encourage future contributions by group 
members being punished. (Carpenter 2007) conducted a similar study in which subjects 
were allowed to punish all other group members in one treatment, and only half of the 
other group members in the other treatment. The results showed that contributions 
increased in the first treatment compared to the second. 
Given the results of the prior literature, we believe that changing various features 
of these two games can lead to a change in behavior on the part of subjects. Intuition, and 
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research, would suggest the following assumptions: rational players will not punish if the 
game is one-shot, the number of punishers in a group will positively correlate with 
contributions of the first and second mover. There is, as the literature shows, a difference 
between observed activity in situations involving trust and situations involving public 
goods. We believe this difference to be a result of inherent differences in the structures of 
the two games. The most important difference between the two, we believe, is the 
sequential nature of contribution turns. In a public goods game, contributions occur 
simultaneously, whereas they are sequential in the trust game. This can lead to a 
perception, in the trust game, of a submissive/dominant relationship between the first and 
second mover, respectively. In the public goods game, it is more reasonable to assume a 
cooperative relationship between players. For this reason, we believe that this dominant 
position of the second mover in the trust game is a reason for the decrease of contributions 
with the aspect of punishment. From an intuitive standpoint, the withholding of 
contributions can be seen as a proxy for control. To take control away from a subject might 
lead to a decrease in contributions, as he or she attempts to retain control of the game. If 
one individual changed their contributions from what they would normally contribute to 
give them an advantage versus the other player, than it could be said that the desire to have 
control influenced the contribution on this player’s behalf. This idea lends itself to a 
potential explanation for the enigma of the trust game. When punishment is added, the 
second mover could interpret this as a loss of control. The natural reaction would be to 
decrease contributions in order to compensate and retain control of the game. The public 
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goods game does not have this dynamic, as control of the game is divided between the 
players whether punishment is an option or not. 
We will attempt to make the two games as structurally similar as possible in order 
to encourage a convergence of contribution trends across the two games. To do this, we 
will distort the division of control in the public goods game by making turns sequential. 
This public goods game will include groups of two, as in trust games, and it will be a one 
shot game. 
4.3 Experimental Design 
4.3.1. Overview of Experimental Design 
The experiments were run at the CBEES (Center for Behavioral and Experimental 
Economic Science) lab at University of Texas at Dallas and at the ERL (Economic 
Research Lab) at Texas A&M University. The sessions were run in July 2010, October 
2014, and June 2015. There are 294 subjects in total.  The average earnings over all 
sessions were approximately $16 dollars. All subjects received a $5 dollar show up fee for 
coming to the lab on time. This is included in the total payment. All sessions were 
computerized and programed in z-tree (Fishbacher 2007). In Table 18, you can see the 
breakdown of the experiments by laboratory and date. All one-shot sessions included one 
TG without punishment, one TG with punishment, one PGG without punishment and one 
PGG with punishment. The order was blocked with respect to TG and PGG. However, the 
punishment was always after the no punishment version. This allows us to make sure there 
are no order effects due to the order of the games. In the repeated versions, subjects played 
20 rounds. This included 5 TG without punishment, 5 TG with punishment, 5 PGG 
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without punishment and 5 PGG with punishment. Again, the order of the first game was 
blocked between PGG and TG, with punishment always following the non-punishment 
version of the game. Table C.1 in Appendix C list the order of experimental sessions for 
both one-shot and repeated. In the repeated version of the task, subjects kept the same 
partner for each task (5 rounds). The pairs were rematched between each task (no 
punishment and punishment). They did not know who their partner was for any round.  
After subjects completed the PGG and TG they completed an Eckel-Grossman risk 
elicitation measure and a survey (see Appendix Figure C.1). Sessions lasted on average 
slightly over 90 minutes. The repeated games took longer than the single shot games.  
 
 
Table 18: Experimental Design Information by Treatment 
 Sequential Contribution  Simultaneous Contribution  
One- Shot Conducted at CBEES lab at UTD 
July 2010 
Sessions of 12 people* 
Average earnings $16 
Time≈ 1 hour 
N=112 
 
Conducted at ERL lab at TAMU 
October 2014 
Sessions of 24-26 people* 
Average earnings $18 
Time≈ 1.5 hour 
N=50 
 
Repeated Conducted at ERL lab at TAMU 
June 2015 
Sessions of 24 & 28 people * 
Average earnings $15 
Time≈ 1.90 hour 
N=52 
 
Conducted at ERL lab at TAMU 
June 2015 
Sessions of 16, 18, & 18 people* 
Average earnings $15 
Time≈1.70 hour 
N=52 
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Subjects completed a total of 5 task in each session. We choose one of the five task 
at random by having a random subject pull a chip from a bag. We then paid everyone for 
the corresponding selected task. In treatments with repeated versions of the games there 
was an exchange rate of 15 tokens= $1 and the exchange rate was 3 tokens=$1 in the one-
shot version.  
4.3.2. Trust Game (TG) 
In the modified trust game, we have groups of two players. Each player receives 
an initial endowment of 30 tokens. In the sequential version of the trust games Player A 
sends some, none or all the tokens to Player B. Any tokens that are transferred to Player 
B are multiplied by 3. After the transfer, Player B has the transferred tokens multiplied by 
3 plus their initial 30 token endowment. They can choose to send any amount back to 
player A. Any amount Player B returns will not be multiplied. In the simultaneous 
treatments, Player A chooses discreet amounts in five token increments to send to Player 
B (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30). While Player A is making the decision on the amount to 
send to Player A, Player B is using the strategy method and making a decision on the 
amount to return for all possible amounts that Player A can send. This allows the decisions 
to be simultaneous. Punishment in the TG happens in a third and final stage of the game. 
Player A can punish Player B. The cost of punishment is 10% of the initial endowment (3 
tokens), and it results in a deduction of 50% of the endowment (15 tokens) for Player B.  
4.3.3. Public Goods Game (PGG) 
In our modified PGG, we use groups of two players. Player A and B both receive 
an initial endowment of 40 tokens. In the simultaneous version both players select how 
 79 
 
many tokens to send to the group account. Any tokens not sent to the group account are 
placed in their own individual account with returns of 1 to 1. All tokens sent to the group 
account are multiplied by 1.5, divided even, and returned to both group members. A 
multiplier of 1.5 creates a marginal per capita return of .75 for each token individually. In 
the sequential PGG, Player A makes the initial allocation into the group account. Player 
B can see the Player A’s allocation and then chooses how much to contribute to the group 
account. Again, the money is multiplied and divided evenly. Punishment in the PGG 
happens in a third stage. Player A can punish Player B. the cost of punishment is 10% (4 
tokens) and the sanction cost Player B 50% of their endowment (20 tokens). 
 
 
4.4 Theoretical Payoffs 
In the following we first describe the payoffs in the public good experiment 
without punishment and then with punishment. The equations are designed for one-shot 
games, with sequential movement. However, to expand the payoffs to repeated or 
simultaneous, you could easily extend the profit functions. These theoretical payoffs look 
at the most basic version.   In each period both of the n subjects in a group, consisting of 
subject i and subject j, receive an equal endowment of y tokens (for our experiment n=2 
and y=40) A subject i can either keep these tokens for him- or herself or invest 𝑔𝑖 tokens 
(0 ≤ 𝑔𝑖 ≤ 40) into a group account. The monetary payoff for each subject i in the pairing 
is given by 
π𝑖 = y - 𝑔𝑖 + α (𝑔𝑖 𝑔𝑗) (3) 
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In the public good experiment without punishment, where α is the marginal per 
capita return from a contribution to the public good. The α in our experiment is equal to 
.75. The decisions about g are made sequentially. Each decision period consists of two 
stages. At the first stage, subject i must decide his or her contribution𝑔𝑖. In the second 
stage, the subject j is informed about i's contribution 𝑔𝑖 and may then decide his or her 
contribution𝑔𝑗.  
The major difference between the no-punishment and the punishment conditions 
is the addition of a third decision stage after the second stage of contribution decisions. At 
the third stage, subject i is given the opportunity to punish subject j after he or she is 
informed about the contribution of subject j. Subject i can punish subject j by assigning a 
so-called punishment point 𝑝𝑗 to j. If subject i decides to assign this punishment point, it 
will reduce the second stage payoff of subject j, π𝑗, by 50 percent of subject j's endowment 
of y  such that 𝑝𝑗 = .5(y) (or 20 tokens). However, the second stage payoff of subject j can 
never be reduced below zero. Subject i has only the option to punish or not to punish 
subject j. Only one punishment point is allowed to be assigned to subject j if punishment 
is chosen. The cost of punishment for subject i is equal to 10 percent of subject i's 
endowment of y such that 𝑝𝑖 = .1(y) (or 4 tokens). The pecuniary payoff of subject i and 
subject j in the punishment condition of the public game can be given, respectively, as π𝑖 
andπ𝑗, and can be written as 
π𝑖 = y - 𝑔𝑖 + α  (𝑔𝑖 𝑔𝑗) - 𝑝𝑖 (4) 
π𝑗 = y - 𝑔𝑗 + α  (𝑔𝑖 𝑔𝑗) - 𝑝𝑗 (5) 
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The total payoff from the public goods periods, both punishment and no-
punishment, is the sum of the payoffs from all periods. 
We will now describe the payoffs in the trust experiment without punishment and 
then with punishment. The trust experiments are very similar to the public good 
experiments. In each period both of the n subjects in a group, consisting of subject i and 
subject j, receive an endowment of y tokens (for our experiment n=2 and y=30). A subject 
can either keep these tokens for him- or herself or contribute 𝑔𝑖 tokens (0 ≤ 𝑔𝑖 ≤ 30) to 
subject j. In the simultaneous version of the TG (𝑔𝑖 = 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30). Any tokens 
sent to subject j are multiplied by multiplier a. For our experiment α =3. Subject j is then 
informed about subject i's contribution 𝑔𝑖 and then can either keep these tokens or 
contribute 𝑔𝑗 tokens (0 ≤ 𝑔𝑗 ≤ (y + 𝑔𝑖) back to subject i. In the simultaneous version, the 
subject makes a decision for all seven possibilities. However, the amount they can return 
in each case is identical using the discreet amounts available. The monetary payoff for 
subjects i and j, respectively, is given by 
 
π𝑖 = y - 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔𝑗 (6) 
π𝑗 = y + α 𝑔𝑖 - 𝑔𝑗 (7) 
 
Where α is a multiplier applied when subject i makes a contribution 𝑔𝑖 to subject 
j. As in the public good experiments, the major difference between the no-punishment and 
the punishment conditions is the addition of a third decision stage after the second stage 
of contribution decisions. At the third stage, subject i is given the opportunity to punish 
subject j after he or she is informed about the contribution of subject j. Subject i can punish 
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subject j by assigning a so-called punishment point 𝑝𝑗 to j. If subject i decides to assign 
this punishment point, it will reduce the second stage payoff of subject j, π𝑗, by 50 percent 
of subject j's endowment of y  such that 𝑝𝑗 = .5(y) ( 15 tokens). However, the second stage 
payoff of subject j can never be reduced below zero. Subject i has only the option to punish 
or not to punish subject j. Only one punishment point is allowed to be assigned to subject 
j if punishment is chosen. The cost of punishment for subject i is equal to 10 percent of 
subject i's endowment of y such that 𝑝𝑖 = .1(y) (3 tokens). The pecuniary payoff of subject 
i and subject j in the punishment condition of the public game can be given, respectively, 
as π𝑖 and π𝑗, and can be written as 
π𝑖 = [y - 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔𝑗] - 𝑝𝑖 (8) 
π𝑗 = [y + α𝑔𝑖 - 𝑔𝑗] - 𝑝𝑗 (9) 
The total payoff from all four conditions is the sum of the period-payoffs, as given 
in (3), (4), (6) and (8) for subject i and (3), (5), (7) and (9) for subject j.  
Though these two games are very similar, there are a few distinctions worth noting. 
In a Public Good game, the roles of the two subjects are parallel. Though their turns are 
sequential, both subjects contribute tokens to a group account. The tokens are then 
distributed back to the subjects evenly, regardless of their contributions. The Trust game 
involves roles that are more distinct. The first subject contributes tokens to the second 
subject. The second subject then has control over the distribution process, having the 
opportunity to contribute as much or as little as he or she would like. Thus, the distribution 
process in the Trust game is defined as 𝑔𝑗  whereas in the Public Good game the 
distribution is predefined as [𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔𝑗]/2. 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1. Sequential, One-Shot 
The first treatment of the game we will investigate is the sequential one-shot game. 
This game structure is identical to the standard trust game. The games are two-players, 
played one time, and the decisions are made in sequential time (player 1 moving first 
followed by player 2.)  For this reason, we do not expect punishment to have different 
effects on the trust game than what is seen in the literature. However, by manipulating the 
PGG into this setting we can identify if the sequential game, being played once effects 
punishment outcomes. In this treatment, we are identifying if changing the public goods 
game to mirror the structure of the TG alleviates the effectiveness of punishment from a 
typical PGG. By examining the mean contributions in Table 19, in both the TG and PGG, 
we can see no increase in trust or trustworthiness from punishment in the standard TG. 
However, we do see a significant increase on Player A’s contribution to the PGG. 
However, when considering both Player A and Player B’s contributions, punishment does 
not increase the amount contributed to the public good overall.  
 
 
Table 19: Mean Contributions Sequential, One-Shot 
 Trust Game Public Goods Game 
 Player A: 
Trust 
Player B: 
Reciprocity 
Player A: 
Contribution 
Player B: 
Contribution 
No 
Punishment 
16.01 
(1.36) 
22.30 
(2.63) 
24.70 
(1.67) 
23.38 
(1.91) 
Punishment 16.55 
(1.32) 
21.16 
(2.41) 
26.75 
(1.78) 
23.11 
(1.99) 
Mean Contribution with standard errors in parentheses  
 84 
 
First, I will observe the TG in more depth. Figure 11, shows the tokens that Player 
A transferred to Player B. The blue bars indicate transfers in the cases of no punishment 
and the red bars when there is a punishment option available. Subjects assigned to the role 
of Player A behave very similar to the baseline even when punishment is a possibility. If 
punishing were increasing the trusting behavior, the distribution of transfers would shift 
to the right. In Figure 12, we can see percent returned by Player B after the money sent by 
Player A had been multiplied by three. On the left side of the plot is the reciprocity 
exhibited by Player B when no punishment is available. The picture on the right side 
captures the reciprocity in the punishment setting. Punishment is not increasing 
trustworthy behavior, much as it did not affect trusting behavior. If the potential threat of 
punishment from Player A were changing Player B’s decision, we would see an increase 
in the amount returned. Examining the percent returned back to Player A, we see that 
subjects in the Player B role returned 46 percent when no punishment is available and only 
42percent when there is a potential of punishment. This indicates that punishment has no 
impact on their reciprocity. Overall using the standard trust game design we find that 
punishment is not increasing trust or trustworthiness in the TG, as the literature has shown.    
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Figure 11: Player A Trust Sequential, One-Shot 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Player B’s Reciprocity Sequential One-Shot 
 
  
 
Next, we can look more in depth at the impact of punishment in a one-shot 
sequential setting on the PGG. This is unlike the traditional PGG in that the contributions 
to the good are happening sequentially. Ultimately, this means that Player A’s contribution 
could have a large impact on how many tokens Player B contributes to the group account. 
In both the non-punishment and punishment treatments, we see Player B contributing less 
than Player A. To understand this more we can observe Figure 13 that maps the 
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distribution of mean contributions of both Player A and Player B. The total average 
contributions to the PGG went up when punishment was available. The slight increase was 
derived entirely from Player’s A slight increase (not significant) in contribution when they 
have the option to punish.  
 
 
Figure 13: Public Good Contribution Sequential One-Sot 
 
 
 
 
One interesting result is the significant difference is the percent of individuals who 
punish in the two games. In the TG 34 percent of Player A’s punished their counterpart. 
This is in comparison to punishment being used 13 percent by the same Player A’s in the 
PGG. This indicated that individuals are more likely to punish in the TG  in this particular 
environment.  A graphical representation can be shown in Figure 14. This figure shows 
punishment by Player A’s in both the TG and the PGG. The 34 percent punishment rate 
that we observe in the TG is similar to findings in the standard TG literature.  
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Manipulating the PGG to be identical to the trust game in all elements other than 
the redistribution mechanisms indicate that punishment is not effective in a one-shot, 
sequential environment. It also indicates that punishment is used in the TG significantly 
more than in the PGG.  
 
 
Figure 14: Percent Who Punish Sequential, One-Shot 
 
 
 
 
4.5.2. Sequential, Repeated 
The second treatment of the game we will observe is the sequential repeated game. 
This game structure is different from both the standard TG and PGG. This design draws 
on the repeated environment from the PGG and the sequential decision making from the 
TG.  Using a hybrid of the distinguishing features will allow tease apart and examine if 
the limited play or the order of decision-making effects contributions. Again, individuals 
move sequentially, player 1 moving first followed by player 2 (like a traditional TG.) 
However, these games are each repeated for 5 round of no punishment and 5 rounds with 
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punishment. This indicates that there is structure designed to impact reputation. Subjects 
are rematched randomly with another person between each block of five games. 
 By examining the mean contributions in Table 20, we observe that punishment 
decreases both trust and trustworthiness in the TG. This indicates that when punishment 
is available Player A is sending less to player B. Player B is also returning less to Player 
A. The average percent Player B returns to Player A without punishment is 59 percent. 
This falls to 56 percent after punishment is introduced. However, the percentage returned 
in increased compared to the one-shot version of the game. The PGG shows a significant 
increase (1% significance level) in contributions for both players after punishment is 
introduced. This finding is similar to what we see in a standard PGG.  
 
 
Table 20: Mean Contributions Sequential, Repeated 
 Trust Game Public Goods Game 
 Player A: 
Trust 
Player B: 
Reciprocity 
Player A: 
Contribution 
Player B: 
Contribution 
No Punishment 
18.82 
(1.00) 
33.08 
(2.15) 
29.97 
(1.23) 
28.31 
(1.34) 
Punishment 
17.80 
(1.08) 
29.87 
(2.27) 
33.27 
(1.10) 
33.32 
(1.08) 
Mean Contribution with standard errors in parentheses  
 
 
 
Again in Figure 15, we can see percent returned by Player B after the money sent 
by Player A had been multiplied by three. The left graph show the no punishment situation; 
while the right graph is when punishment is available. Punishment is not increasing the 
amount Player B returns to Player A when the five rounds are averaged. This indicates 
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that punishment is not promoting a more trustworthy environment when the game is 
repeated and punishment is available.   
 
 
Figure 15: Player B’s Reciprocity Sequential Repeated 
 
  
 
 
In the sequential repeated version of the game trust nor trustworthiness were 
impacted by the punishment regime. Looking at the results for the PGG we see something 
different. Punishment significantly increased both Player A and Player B’s contributions 
to the public good. Figure 16, plots the mean contributions of both types of player over 
the 10 rounds. On the left side of the figure we can observe the five periods without 
punishment. Subjects started with contributions of 30 tokens and that slightly fell to 
approximately 26 tokens by the last no punishment period. The right hand graph of Figure 
16 shows an interesting picture with contributions starting in the punishment rounds at 33 
tokens, peaking in round 9 at 36 tokens and ultimately dropping to similar points where 
the no punishment rounds ended. This indicates that subjects consider the last round of the 
game a one-shot scenario, with no future reputation being risked. This is something that 
is very common throughout the public goods literature.  There is also evidence of Player 
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B matching Player A’s contribution due to the sequential order of contributions to the 
good.  
 
 
Figure 16: Mean Contribution PGG Sequential, Repeated 
   
 
 
 
A final thing observed in the sequential, repeated treatment is the rates of 
punishment in the two games. Figure 17 shows a clear picture of less punishment than the 
sequential one-shot setting. However, it still holds that the subjects punish significantly 
more in the TG than in the PGG. Subjects punish 29 percent of the time in the Trust game 
with only a mere 7 percent punishing in the trust game.   
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Figure 17: Percent Who Punish Sequential, Repeated 
 
 
 
 
Making this hybrid version of the PGG and TG, has shown that punishment is 
effective for public goods provisions in the repeated version, unlike the one-shot version. 
The sequential order of the game is not changing the impact punishment has on increased 
contributions. However manipulating the trust game to be played more than once does not 
create an environment where participants are increasing their trust or trustworthiness. This 
indicates that the sequential nature of TG does not allow punishment to increase sharing 
from either player.   
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In this particular treatment, Player A and Player B are making their decisions at the same 
time. This creates an environment much like a traditional PGG, where the players do not 
know what their counterpart contributes until the end of the round. In this case, there are 
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in Table 21, we observe that punishment decreases both trust and trustworthiness in the 
TG. This indicates that when punishment is available Player A is sending less to player B. 
Player B is also returning less to Player A. The average percent Player B returns to Player 
A without punishment is 37 percent. This increases to 38 percent after punishment is 
introduced. The percent Player B returns is similar to the other one-shot treatment and 
lower than repeated interactions. The PG shows a non-significant increase in contributions 
for Player A and a non-significant decrease for Player B to the public good after 
punishment is introduced. This finding is similar to what we see in a non-standard single 
PGG.  
 
 
Table 21: Mean Contributions Simultaneous, One-Shot 
 Trust Game Public Goods Game 
 
Player A: 
Trust 
Player B: 
Reciprocity 
Player A: 
Contribution 
Player B: 
Contribution 
No 
Punishment 
11.20 
(1.94) 
12.28 
(3.11) 
17.52 
(2.57) 
22.64 
(2.28) 
Punishment 
9.4 
(2.05 
10.6 
(2.91) 
19.08 
(2.74) 
21.68 
(2.65) 
Mean Contribution with standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
Next, the attention will focus on the transfers indicating trust and the returns that 
proxy trustworthiness in the TG. Figure 18, shows the tokens that Player A transferred to 
Player B. The blue bars indicate transfers in the cases of no punishment and the red bars 
indicate transfers when punishment can be implemented.  If punishing were increasing the 
trusting behavior, the distribution of transfers would shift to the right. In Figure 19, we 
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can see percent returned by Player B after the money sent by Player A had been multiplied. 
The left side is the reciprocity exhibited by Player B when no punishment is available, and 
on the right side is the picture when punishment is possible. Punishment is not increasing 
trustworthy behavior. If the potential threat of punishment from Player A were changing 
Player B’s decision, we would see a significant increase in the amount returned. This 
indicates that punishment is not increasing trust or trustworthiness in the TG.   
 
 
Figure 18: Player A Trust Simultaneous, One-Shot 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Player B's Reciprocity Simultaneous, One-Shot 
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To examine the complete effects of punishment on the two games we need to look 
more in depth at the PGG. The simultaneous contribution is in line with a traditional PGG, 
however most PGG are played repeatedly. Figure 20 maps the distribution of contributions 
of Player A and Player B together. Both players chose how much to contribute to the group 
account at the same time. Meaning that Player A’s contribution should have no impact in 
the contribution of Player B. The total average contributions to the PGG went up when 
punishment was available.  
 
 
Figure 20: Public Goods Contributions Simultaneous, One-Shot 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the percent of individuals who punish in both games, we see a different 
picture than the previous treatments. Figure 21 indicates that both the PGG and the TG 
have high levels of punishment. In the TG 32 percent of individuals punish and the PGG 
has a high punishment rate of 24 percent. This indicates that people punish more when the 
PGG is simultaneous one-shot, than in any of the two sequential PGG.  
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Figure 21: Percent Who Punish Simultaneous, One-Shot 
 
 
 
 
 Making this hybrid version of the PGG and TG, has shown that punishment is 
used more often in the one-shot simultaneous game than either of the sequential 
treatments. However, punishment is not successful increasing contributions in either the 
TG or the PGG when the game is sequential and played only once. The effects of 
punishment are predicted by the trust literature, but the PGG literature indicates that 
punishment should increase contributions even in the one-shot version. However, since 
out PGG are only two players the increase in contribution could be in part to this design 
feature.  
4.5.4. Simultaneous, Repeated 
The final treatment that I will examine is the simultaneous, repeated version of the 
PGG and TG. This framework is the most similar to the traditional PGG, where subjects 
make their contributions at the same time and play the game multiple rounds. Traditionally 
in the previous literature punishment, opportunities increase contributions in this type of 
public goods setting. The mean contributions can be seen in Table 22. Under this regime 
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we find that trust and trustworthiness do not increase when punishment is available. 
However, we do see increase to both players’ public goods contributions. This indicates 
that even though are game settings are manipulated by number of players the overall result, 
that punishment increase contributions, within the PGG literature still holds true.   
 
 
Table 22: Mean Contributions Simultaneous, Repeated 
 Trust Game Public Goods Game 
 Player A: 
Trust 
Player B: 
Reciprocity 
Player A: 
Contribution 
Player B: 
Contribution 
No 
Punishment 
20.04 
(1.00) 
33.60 
(2.17) 
29.25 
(1.15) 
28.34 
(1.18) 
Punishment 
19.38 
(1.04) 
31.95 
(2.11) 
31.84 
(1.11) 
32.95 
(0.97) 
Mean Contribution with standard errors in parentheses  
 
 
 
 To further understand the results we will first look at Figure 22, where we can see 
percent returned by Player B after the money sent by Player A had been multiplied by 
three in the TG. Player B returns 56 percent of the multiplied transfer to Player A without 
punishment. There is no significant difference in the percent returned (55 percent) when 
punishment is available.   The findings are consistent through all four treatments.  
In the simultaneously repeated version of the TG transfers from Player A to Player 
B did not increase with the possibility of punishment. We also did not find an increase in 
trustworthy behavior, or the amount returned from Player B to Player A. On the contrary 
when looking at the results for the PGG we see something different. Punishment increased 
both Player A and Player B’s contributions to the public good. Figure 23, plots the mean 
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contributions of both types of player over the 10 rounds. The plot on the left side of the 
figure left side of the figure plots mean contributions for the five periods without 
punishment. Subjects started with contributions of 27 tokens increasing by round 4 to over 
30 tokens. The last period of the no punishment rounds players decreased their 
contributions to 26 tokens. The contributions on the right side, when punishment is 
available show a slightly different picture. We see contributions in the 6th round starting 
lower but increasing 34 tokens contribution by the second round. This contribution level 
is sustained until the last round where they drop back to the levels from the first round 
with punishment.  This again indicates that subjects consider the last round of the game a 
one-shot scenario, with no future reputation being risked.  
 
 
Figure 22: Player B's Reciprocity Simultaneous, Repeated 
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Figure 23: Mean Contribution PGG Simultaneous, Repeated 
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Figure 24: Percent Who Punish Simultaneous, Repeated 
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the trust game is an environment where individuals either feel more comfortable 
punishing, or believe the punishment will have a stronger impact. The findings indicate 
that the duration of the play (one-shot and repeated) nor the order of decisions 
(simultaneous and sequential) can make punishment effects similar in the two games.  
 
 
Table 23: Mean Contributions All Treatments 
 Sequential Contribution Simultaneous Contribution 
O
n
e-
Sh
o
t 
 Trust Public Goods Trust Public Goods 
No 
Punishment 
16.01 22.30 24.70 23.38 11.20 12.28 17.52 22.64 
Punishment 16.55 21.16 26.75 23.11 9.40 10.60 19.08 21.68 
% Who 
Punish 
34% 13% 32% 24% 
R
ep
ea
te
d
 
No 
Punishment 
18.82 33.08 29.97 28.31 20.04 33.60 29.25 28.34 
Punishment 17.80 29.87 33.27 33.32 19.38 31.95 31.84 32.95 
% Who 
Punish 
29% 7% 23% 8% 
 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Although I created an experiment where the designed games are as similar as 
possible, while keeping the unique integrity of the game intact, I was  unsuccessful at 
identifying what part of the game creates the disparity in punishment effects. The results 
are conclusive that the different outcomes from punishment are not related to the order of 
play, meaning which player moves first, and what information is available to Player B. 
This is an interesting finding because using a sequential solicitation for PGG does create 
a player matching incentive when Player B received information on Player A’s 
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contribution. This experiment also offers evidence that the disparity in punishment effects 
is not related to one-shot or repeated action. The only difference that was expressed in the 
data on the rounds played was that punishment in the PGG works better if there are 
repeated interactions. This means that individuals are more likely to respond to the 
availability of punishment if the interaction is continued over several periods.  
In no case was punishment an effective tool in increasing Player A’s transfer to 
player B in the Trust game. This indicates that the punishment in the trust game is not 
related to the order of play nor the one-shot or repeated interaction.  
The results do show strong support for punishment being more prevalent in the 
TGG in any situation that in the PGG. The redistribution structure of the game may have 
much explanatory power in this anomaly. In the trust game, individuals have no return on 
investment if Player B does not return any invested funds. However, in the PGG you are 
guaranteed a return of .75 on every dollar contributed no matter what your counterpart 
does. This makes the potential loss much greater in the trust game than the PGG.  
Manipulating the games has ruled out two possible explanations for the different 
effect of punishment on two popular incentive games in experimental economics. By 
understanding and identifying the structure of the games, we are able to interpret the 
results and rule out the game manipulations as motivators of the disparity in punishment. 
Several more avenues need to be explored before we can completely understand the 
differences. In future work, it might be beneficial to consider the games redistribution 
mechanism and lower the MPCR in the PGG. However, this change is difficult to construct 
without changing the overall premise of the games themselves. Another thing that might 
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be of interest to observe would be group size. All games examined in this study had two 
players. It is likely the punishment might increase contributions in a group trust game, 
although this type of game is not common and difficult to construct and keep the structure 
true to a TG.  
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The three essays that comprise this dissertation have looked at how pro-social 
behavior can effect giving and altruism in multiple scenarios. Specifically we look the 
impact of community characteristics and social norms in section 2, positive pro-social 
engagement in section 3, and finally negative pro-social punishment enforcement in 
section 4.  
In section 2, we use data collected in the field to examine risk-sharing norms across 
three unique communities Heterogeneity in risk-sharing behavior could result from 
variation in individual preferences, or from systematic differences in norms of behavior 
in different social settings. The individuals in the communities differ with regard to 
income, race, education, and employment. The communities differ with respect to access 
to credit, risk exposure and insurance experience.  We identify the social and cultural 
norms that motivate individuals to share risk. In addition, comparing behavior with and 
without a market insurance option allows us to gauge the strength of sharing norms across 
communities.    
We find that patterns of sharing differ markedly across communities. The poorest 
community has the highest level of risk sharing in the game. When insurance is offered, 
70 percent of our subjects choose to purchase the formal product. We also find that with 
the possibility of insurance, transfers drop sharply in the higher-income communities, but 
are impacted the least in the poorest community. Thus individuals who are not insured 
have a much higher level of community support and higher expected outcomes in the 
communities with the highest level of risk-sharing norms. To us, this indicates that the 
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risk-sharing norms in the poor community are very strong, and are not “crowded out” by 
the availability of a market alternative.  
Our results indicate that the prevalence of informal risk sharing in the absence of 
formal institutions is not restricted to less developed countries, but can also be found in 
poor areas in developed countries. We also see that the impact of a formal market 
alternative can vary greatly, depending on the strength of social norms of risk sharing in 
the communities.  
In section 3, we addresses pro-social behavior with respect to charitable giving. In 
this section we identify the impacts of a successful campaign on charitable organizations. 
We conduct a “real donation” lab experiment to test whether a successful campaign 
crowds out giving to other charities. The campaign we use is a simple video campaign 
giving basic information on one of the charities. By comparing the subjects’ allocations 
before and after the campaign, we measure the effect of the campaign on giving, both to 
the target of the campaign and the other two charities. In all cases the campaign succeeded 
in increasing giving to the target organization, indicating that the campaigns were 
effective. However, in all cases, total giving (the sum of donations to all three charities) 
remained unchanged.  That is, the increase in giving to the target charity came entirely at 
the expense of the other charities.  This provides strong evidence for a ‘crowding-out’ 
effect for a targeted campaign. We see that subjects do not increase their charitable 
expenditures after receiving the video treatment. Instead, they reallocate funds from other 
charities to the targeted charity. This provides the first evidence of the impact on total 
giving of a successful fundraising campaign. We see that campaigns impact individuals in 
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the intensive margin, giving strong evidence that individuals have a budget to allocate to 
potential charitable causes. We do see increase in giving to the targeted charity, but at the 
expense of non-target charities. This gives strong evidence that multiple charities can act 
as a substitute for donors, even if the causes are not related. 
To examine this more in depth we design an additional treatment where we prime 
general charitable behavior, in an attempt to reduce the apparent tradeoff between 
charitable causes. We find a general charitable prime does not produce an increase in 
money sent to the three charities. These results support our prior evidence that subjects 
have a set budget of spending with regard to charitable contributions.  
In section 3, I explore a puzzle presented by past experimental literature on two 
popular games, the trust game and the public goods game. Prior research shows that 
punishment has opposite effects in the two games, increasing cooperation in the public 
goods game, but reducing trust and reciprocity in the trust game. While both games are 
used to study cooperation, they differ in several key ways.  I focus on two in particular: 
the trust game is played sequentially (first mover followed by second mover), while in the 
public goods game play is simultaneous; and the trust game is usually played only once, 
while the public goods game is typically repeated for multiple rounds.  By constructing 
hybrid versions of the games to make them more similar, I attempt to identify the cause of 
the difference in impact and disentangle the effects of punishment. Using two person trust 
and public goods games, I offer four different treatments in a two-by-two design that varies 
both the order of moves (sequential vs. simultaneous) as well as the number of rounds 
(repeated vs. one-shot). Looking at the contributions in each of these treatments with and 
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without punishment helps isolate whether the order of participation or the number of 
rounds played is affecting the disparity in the punishment effects. The findings indicate 
that even in the new games, punishment is unsuccessful in increasing trust or reciprocity 
in all four versions of the trust game. However, punishment is effective in the modified 
public goods game, but only in the repeated versions. Punishment is used significantly less 
in the public goods game than in the trust game. This indicates that the structural 
differences in the game are not the root cause for the disparity in punishment effects.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Characteristic South Dallas Port Lavaca Brownwood 
# of Subjects 201 71 98 
% Female 61% 71% 63% 
% African-American 96% 9.90% 7.10% 
% Caucasian 1.8% 46.0% 79.6% 
% Hispanic 2.2% 36.6% 9.2% 
Mean Age 43.5 49.1 48.9 
% Marital Status    
Married 17.9% 49.1% 50.0% 
Single 54.4% 18.3% 11.2% 
Divorced/Separated 14.4% 15.5% 16.3% 
% Employment    
Student    
Full-Time 10.4% 39.4% 50.0% 
Part-Time 10.9% 5.6% 5.1% 
Temporary 16.9% 7.0% 5.1% 
% Highest Education    
No HS Degree 22.9% 22.5% 6.1% 
HS Graduate 41.8% 39.4% 25.5% 
Some College 26.5% 25.4% 40.8% 
College Graduate 8.8% 12.7% 27.6% 
    
Median Income Less than 10K 20K-30K 30K-40K 
Table A. 1: Demographic Information by Community 
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Figure A. 1: Preference Measures 
 
Figure A. 2: Baseline and Treatment When Insurance is Forgone 
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APPENDIX B 
 
     
Figure B. 1: Mean Giving to Targeted Charity, Conditional on Giving  
 
 
Figure B. 2: Mean Giving to Charity, Conditional on Giving  
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Figure B. 3: Session 1 Mean Contribution 
 
 
 
Figure B. 4: Session 2 Mean Contribution 
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Figure B. 5: Session Mean Contribution 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Figure C. 1: Eckel-Grossman Risk Elicitation Measure 
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Table C. 1: Experimental Design Ordering 
  
Order Blocking 
Order A Order B 
Public goods with no punishment (1 or 5  
Rounds) 
Trust with no punishment 
(1 or 5  Rounds) 
Public goods with punishment 
(1 or 5  Rounds) 
Trust with punishment 
(1 or 5  Rounds) 
Trust with no punishment 
(1 or 5  Rounds) 
Public goods with no punishment 
(1 or 5  Rounds) 
Trust with punishment 
(1 or 5  Rounds) 
Public goods with punishment 
(1 or 5  Rounds) 
Eckel-Grossman Risk game 
(One-Shot) 
Eckel-Grossman Risk game 
(One-Shot) 
Survey Survey 
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APPENDIX D 
INSTRUCTIONS AND DECISION SHEETS  
Instructions for “Using Experimental Games to Understand Risk Sharing Behavior in 
Three Communities 
Baseline: Instructions were read aloud with pictorial examples from the experimenter 
Please open your booklets to Activity 8 on Page 3. Does everyone have this page?  
OK, please turn the page. You will see a sheet that says Activity 8 Example. This sheet is for 
practice. You will make your choices on a different page. Let‘s walk through the example.  
For Activity 8, you will be placed in a group of 3 people, you and two others. You will not know 
who they are, and they will not know who you are.  
If this activity is chosen for payment, then you will pull a chip out of this bag. The bag has two 
chips with a ―W  on them and one chip with an ―L  on it. If you pull out the chip with the ―W  
on it, then you win and make $75. If you pull out the chip with the ―L  on it, then you lose and 
make $0.  
If you draw a ―W  you can choose to send some of your winnings to the people in your group 
who draw an ―L  if you want to.  
There are several possible things that could happen.  
1st: All three people draw ―W. In this case each of you makes $75.  
2nd: All three people draw ―L. In this case each of you makes $0  
Next, you could draw ―L  and either one or both of the other people in your group draw a ―W.  
In this case, the amount of money you make depends on the amount of money that the people who 
draw ―W  send to you.  
You will need to make a decision for two different situations. In the first situation, you will decide 
how much you want to send if one person draws ―L and the other person draws ―W. In the 
second situation you will decide how much you want to send if two people draw ―L.  You do not 
have to send anything if you don‘t want to. You need to choose for both situations because you do 
not know ahead of time who will draw an ―L or a ―W. The other people in your group will make 
the same decision.  
You will write in the amount that you want to send if one person draws ―L  here [point to poster], 
and you will write in the amount that you want to send if two people draw ―L  here [point to 
poster].  
Payoff: If this is the activity chosen for payment, then we will come around the room and each of 
you will pull a chip out of the bag. We will mark in your booklet whether you draw a ―L  or a 
―W  and then put the chip back in the bag and continue around the room.  
We will then put all of the booklets in a pile and shuffle them. We will then pull out 3 at random 
to form the groups. Again, you will not know who is in your group and they will not know who 
you are.  
If you draw a ―W,  you make $75 minus the amount you decide to send to people who draw a 
―L.  If you draw a ―L  then you make $0 plus the amount that the people in your group decide 
to send. Are there any questions?  
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OK, please turn your booklets to page 7 and write in the amount you would like to send, if 
anything. 
 
Treatment  (Insurance)  
For Task 4, you will be placed in a group of 3 people, you and two others. But, just like the last 
task, you will not know who they are, and they will not know who you are.  
Part of this task is similar to the one we just finished, but parts of it are different. Please listen to 
the instructions before making your choices. 
 
Just like the last task, if this task is chosen for payment, then you will pull a chip out of this bag. 
The bag has two chips with a “W” on them and one chip with a “L” on it. If you pull out the chip 
with the “W” on it, then you win and make $75. If you pull out the chip with the “L” on it, then 
you lose and make $0. 
 
Only for this task, you also have the option of spending the $20 you received for coming today. 
You do not have to pay this fee. But, if you choose to pay the $20 fee then it will guarantee that 
you will draw a “W” and will win $75 for sure if this activity is chosen for payment. 
 
If you want to pay the fee, all you have to do is put a check mark in this box [mark on poster]. If 
you do not want to pay the fee, put a check mark in this box [mark on poster]. 
 
Like the previous task, if you draw a “W” you can choose to send some of your winnings to the 
people in your group who draw a “L” and lose their money, if you want to.  
 
Note that in this situation, the only way it is possible for the other group members to draw a “L” 
is if they decided not to pay the fee. 
 
So first thing, you will have to put a check mark here or here if you want to pay the fee or not. 
Then you will write in the amount that you want to send if one person does not pay the fee and 
draws “L” here [point to poster], and you will write in the amount that you want to send if two 
people do not pay the fee and draw “L” here [point to poster]. 
Payoff: 
If this task is selected for payment, we will then put all of the booklets in a pile and shuffle them. 
We will then pull out 3 at random to form the groups. Again, you will not know who is in your 
group and they will not know who you are.  
Are there any questions? 
 
OK, please turn your booklets, decide if you want to pay the fee and write in the amount you 
would like to send, if anything to the members in your group who do not pay the fee and draw an 
“L”. 
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Instructions for “Did the Icebucket Challenge Drain the Philanthropic Reservoir?” 
Please do not talk to any other subjects during the experiment or turn ahead to any pages 
until you are instructed to do so.  
You are going to participate in a study of decision-making. The study will last about 20 minutes. 
You will receive compensation based on the decisions you make, which will be paid to you in 
cash at the end of the study. You will receive $5 as a show up fee regardless of the decisions 
made today. How your decisions affect your compensation is explained below.  
A monitor will be randomly chosen from the experiment participants. The monitor is responsible 
for verifying that all the decisions are made according to the instructions. The monitor is also 
responsible for making sure that any money donated to organizations in the course of the 
experiment actually is donated online to the organization at the conclusion of the experiment. At 
the end of the experiment, the monitor will sign a form verifying that procedures were followed 
as described in the instructions. 
There are two rounds in this study. At the end of the study, one round will be selected at random 
for payment, and the choices that you make for that round will be implemented.  Any amounts 
donated to a charitable organization will be donated online, and you will be able to access the 
receipts by sending a request to the ERL. The amount not donated will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment.   
Allocation Problems 
For this study, you will be allocated $15 in each of two rounds. Your compensation will be 
determined by your choices in ONE of the two rounds, selected at random. The decision that you 
will be paid for is dependent upon a die roll, with 1-3 paying Decision 1 and 4-6 paying Decision 
2. You do not know, and we do not know, which round will be selected for payment, so your 
best bet is to make your decisions in each round as if that is the round that is paid.  
In each round, you must decide how to allocate the $15 between yourself and three charitable 
organizations. All three charities are Texas non-profit organizations.   
 
The three charities are: 
Operation Kindness: Founded in 1976, Operation Kindness is the oldest and largest no-kill 
shelter in North Texas.  
Feeding Texas: Feeding Texas, formerly known as the Texas Food Bank Network (TFBN) is a 
statewide, 501(c) nonprofit organization. Its mission is to lead a unified effort for a hunger-free 
Texas.  
Texas Campaign for the Environment: Texas Campaign for the Environment is dedicated to 
informing and mobilizing Texans to protect the quality of their lives, their health, their 
communities and the environment.  
 
Examples: Let us look at three examples of decisions, as they will appear on your DECISION 
SHEET. These are just sample allocations.  When you make your actual decision, you may 
choose any allocation you like.   
Note: The sum of the four columns must be no more than your $15 endowment. All amounts 
must be in whole dollar increments.  
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Example 1: 
For example, you might decide to allocate all of the money to one organization. In this case, you 
and the other two organizations would receive zero.  
Endowment Operation 
Kindness 
Feeding Texas Texas Campaign 
for the 
Environment 
Yourself 
$15 $0 $15 $0 $0 
 
Example 2: 
You might decide to allocate the money equally among the three organizations and yourself.  
Endowment Operation 
Kindness 
Feeding Texas Texas Campaign 
for the 
Environment 
Yourself 
$15 $4 $4 $4  $3 
 
Example 3: 
Or you might make some other allocation:  
Endowment Operation 
Kindness 
Feeding Texas Texas Campaign 
for the 
Environment 
Yourself 
$15 $2 $4 $1 $8 
 
NOTE: The only requirement is that the four columns must add up to the $15 endowment. A 
calculator is provided. 
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Decision Sheets For “Did the Icebucket Challenge Drain the Philanthropic Reservoir?” 
Decision Sheet 1: 
 
 
Round 1: 
 
Please allocate your given endowment between the four categories below.  
Note: The sum of the four columns must be no more than your $15 endowment. All amounts 
must be in whole dollar increments.  
 
 
Endowment Operation 
Kindness 
Feeding Texas Texas 
Campaign for 
the 
Environment 
Yourself 
$15 $______ $______ $______ $______ 
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Decision Sheet 2: 
 
In this round, you will once again have the opportunity to allocate a new $15 endowment 
between the three charities and yourself.  
 
Before you make any decisions, a randomly chosen video will be played detailing additional 
information on one of the charities.  
 
Please wait for the video to conclude before making any allocation decisions 
 
STOP 
Please do not turn the page until instructed. 
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Decision Sheet 2: 
 
Please allocate your given endowment between the four categories below. 
Note: The sum of the four columns must be no more than your $15 endowment. All amounts 
must be in whole dollar increments.  
 
 
Endowment Operation 
Kindness 
Feeding Texas Texas 
Campaign for 
the 
Environment 
Yourself 
$15 $______ $______ $______ $______ 
 
 
 
STOP 
Please do not turn the page until instructed. 
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 GSS Altruism Survey for “Did the Icebucket Challenge Drain the Philanthropic 
Reservoir?” 
 (Part of post survey)  
All on 1-5 scale (1=Never, 2=Once, 3= More than once, 4=Often, 5=Very Often) 
1.) I have helped push a stranger's car that was broken down or out of gas. 
2.) I have given directions to a stranger. 
3.) I have made change for a stranger. 
4.) I have given money to a charity. 
5.) I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it). 
6.) I have donated goods or clothes to a charity. 
7.) I have done volunteer work for a charity. 
8.) I have donated blood. 
9.) I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (books, parcels, etc). 
10.) I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger. 
11.) I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup (in the supermarket, at a copy machine, 
at a fast-food restaurant). 
12.) I have given a stranger a lift in my car. 
13.) l have pointed out a clerk's error (in a bank, at the supermarket) in undercharging me for an 
item. 
14.) I have let a neighbor whom I didn't know too well borrow an item of some value to me (eg, a 
dish, tools, etc). 
15.) I have bought 'charity' holiday cards deliberately because I knew it was a good cause. 
16.) I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with an assignment when my 
knowledge was greater than his or hers. 
17.) I have, before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbor's pets or children without being 
paid for it. 
18.) I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street. 
19.) I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a stranger who was standing. 
20.) I have helped an acquaintance to move households. 
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Video Script for “Did the Icebucket Challenge Drain the Philanthropic Reservoir?” 
Video 1: Feeding Texas:  “Hi, my name is Adam Zindler, and I’m a member of the Fightin’ Texas 
Aggie class of 2016, a-a-a-whoop! Listen up, y’all, ‘cause I would like to tell you a little bit about 
a charity called ‘Feeding Texas’. So these guys do a heck of a lot of good here in Texas. ‘Feeding 
Texas’ is a non-profit, dedicated to wiping out hunger all across the state. They’re active in 
communities all across Texas, with a network of food banks that gave away more than three 
hundred million pounds of food just last year. That means helping almost three and a half million 
Texans every year. They’re out there trying to solve the problem of hunger in our communities, 
including here in Brazos County, and they need your help. Thank you for considering ‘Feeding 
Texas’ as you make your decisions today.” 
 
Video 2: Operation Kindness: “Hi, my name is Adam Zindler, and I’m a member of the Fightin’ 
Texas Aggie class of 2016, a-a-a-whoop! Listen up, ya’ll, ‘cause I would like to tell you a bit about 
a charity called ‘Operation Kindness’. These guys do a heck of a lot of good here in Texas. 
‘Operation Kindness’ is the oldest, and largest no-kill shelter in Texas, and they’ve saved more 
than seventy five thousand animals. That’s about three hundred animals they care for daily, and 
more than three thousand dogs and cats they help every year. ‘Operation Kindness’ is a non-profit, 
and doesn’t get any government funding. This means that they need donations from people like 
you to stay afloat. Thank you for considering ‘Operation Kindness’ as you make your decisions 
today.” 
 
Video 3: Texas Campaign for the Environment: “Hi, my name is Adam Zindler, and I’m a member 
of the Fightin’ Texas Aggie class of 2016, a-a-a-whoop! Listen up, ya’ll, ‘cause I’d like to tell 
ya’ll a little bit about a charity called ‘Texas Campaign for the Environment’, and they do a heck 
of a lot of good here in Texas. What’s our most precious resource? That’s Texas itself, obviously, 
and the ‘Texas Campaign for the Environment’ is out there protecting the state we love so much, 
because we want our children, and our children’s children to live in a place just as beautiful, and 
as healthy, as where we live now. Ninety percent of their funding comes directly from donations, 
and three quarters goes directly towards environmental advocacy, community organizing, and 
public education. If you love Texas, vote with your dollar, and help these folks out. Thank you for 
considering the ‘Texas Campaign for the Environment’ as you make your decisions today.”  
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Experimenter Script for “Did the Icebucket Challenge Drain the Philanthropic 
Reservoir?” 
Experimenter reads everything in italics but only things in italics. 
General Instructions: 
This is a study of economic decision making. Your earnings in this study depend on the decisions 
that you make. You will be paid these earnings privately in class at the end of the session today.  
Please take a minute to turn off your cellphones. There is no talking during the study except to ask 
questions. If you have questions at any time, please raise your hand and someone will come and 
assist you. Please make sure to hold on to your Subject ID number. You will need it throughout 
the experiment, and for payment. 
 
Instructions: 
Howdy, 
This study will last about 30 minutes. You will receive compensation based on the decisions you 
make, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the study. How your decisions affect your 
compensations is explained below. 
A monitor will now be selected at random. *Randomly select monitor*. The monitor is responsible 
for verifying that all the decisions are made according to the instructions. The monitor is also 
responsible for making sure that any money donated to organizations in the course of the 
experiment actually gets donated online to the organization at the conclusion of the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment the monitor will sign a form verifying that procedures were followed 
as described in the instructions. 
 
(Have monitor come to the front of the room. Hand them the monitor sheet and explain to 
them their duties.) 
 
There are two rounds in this study. At the end of the study, one round will be selected at random 
for payment, and the choices that you make for that round will be implemented. Any amounts 
donated to a charitable organization will be donated online, and you will be able to access the 
receipts by sending a request to the ERL. The amount not donated will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
Allocation Problems  
For this study, you will be allocated $15 in each of two rounds. Your compensation will be 
determined by your choices in ONE of the two rounds, selected at random. The decision that you 
will be paid for is dependent upon a die roll, with numbers 1,2,& 3 paying Decision 1 and numbers 
4,5,& 6 paying Decision 2. The monitor will roll the die that decides the round in which you will 
be paid. You do not know, and we do not know, which round will be selected for payment, so your 
best bet is to make your decisions in each round as if that is the round that is paid. In each round 
you must decide how to allocate the $15 between yourself and three charitable organizations. All 
three charities are Texas non-profit organizations. 
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Please take a few moments to look over the three charities. 
WAIT 1 MINUTE and wait until everyone looks up. 
Please turn to the next page Titled “Examples.” 
 
Examples: 
Let’s look at three examples of decisions as they will appear on your DECISION SHEET. 
These are just sample allocations. When you make your actual decision you may choose any 
allocation you like in whole dollar increments. Note: The sum of the four columns must be no more 
than your $15 endowment. Again, all dollar amounts must be in whole dollar increments. 
Example 1: 
For example, you might decide to allocate all of the money to one organization, in this case 
Feeding Texas. In this case, you and the other two organizations would receive zero dollars. 
Example 2: 
You might decide to allocate the money nearly equally among the three organizations and yourself. 
All three charities would receive four dollars and you would receive three. 
Example 3: 
You might choose another allocation. In this example, the three charities would each get different 
amounts and you would receive eight dollars. 
Are there any questions? 
Please turn to the next page, titled “Decision Sheet 1:” 
 
Decision 1: 
Please allocate your given endowment between yourself and the three charities below. 
Note that all columns must add up to $15 in whole dollar increments and all allocations must be 
in whole dollar amounts. 
 
WAIT 2 Minutes or until you think everyone is done 
Please turn to the next page titled “Decision Sheet 2:” 
 
Decision 2 
In this round, you will once again have the opportunity to allocate a new $15 endowment between 
the three charities and yourself. 
Please welcome Marc Rauckhorst, he has an important message for ya’ll. 
 Hi, my name is Marc Rauckhorst, Fightin’ Texas Aggie Class of 2016 A­A­A­Whoop!!! Now we’re 
going to show you a video about a charity that does a bunch of great things here in Texas. We 
challenge you to really think the about the effects your donation will have on homeless animals 
here in Texas. Your donation truly matters. Pay close attention to the upcoming video. It contains 
*vital* information. 
 
 
PLAY VIDEO 
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Thanks for listening. We challenge you to give now. Please turn to the following page, also entitled 
Decision Sheet 2: Please allocate your given endowment between yourself and the three charities 
below. Note: The sum of the four columns must be no more than your $15 endowment. All amounts 
must be in whole dollar increments. 
 
After 2 minutes or when you feel everyone is done: 
Thank you for participating in the first section of the experiment. Please make sure that your 
random Subject Number is written in the top right of the front page of this packet. 
Has everyone written their Subject Number on the front of their packet? 
One of the experimenters will come around and pick up your sheet shortly. Please stay seated and 
quiet and do not change any answers already written. Thank you. 
 
Have monitor come to the stage and roll the die to figure out which decision will be paid. 
Make sure the monitor announces what die number he/she rolls. Monitor will leave the room 
with two people to fill in spreadsheet and make payment envelopes. 
Depending on decision selected by die roll, fill out spreadsheet, and make envelopes for 
payment. 
 
While monitor is exiting room, pass out survey. 
 
Survey 
Everyone should now have a survey packet that looks like this *hold up packet* in front of them. 
Write the Subject Number assigned to you in the top right corner on the front page of this packet. 
Has everyone written their Subject Number on the front of their packet? 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. 
When you are finished, raise your hand and an experimenter will pick up your survey and give 
you a receipt form to fill out. When payments are ready, an experimenter will escort you to the 
payment window. You will need your subject ID card to receive the payment at the window.  
 
